2026
Print this pageIPPT20260602, UPC CoA, Kodak v Fujifilm
Infringement orders for UK and Germany set aside. No infringement in Germany because private prior use right of Kodak Graphic (Article 28 UPCA). Alleged infringement by Kodak Graphic in UK unsubstantiated (Article 25 UPCA). Fujifilm accepts that under UK law the importer is the party who has legal and beneficial interest in the goods. Under German case law ‘manufacture’ […] does not mean processing or transforming the material oneself: a person who has a material processed into a new item under a contract for work may be regarded as the manufacturer Claim construction (Article 69 EPC). There is no general rule that the skilled person would always and automatically take into account fluctuations which are due to the manufacturing process and the measurement method and in doing so would automatically add deviations to the – as such precise – numerical value in a claim feature. This may be a result of claim interpretation but is not inherent to the use of a numerical value in a claim. Front Loaded Proceedings (Rule 29(c) RoP, R. 263 RoP). It is not contrary to the lodging of a Rejoinder to the Reply to the Statement of defence. or the front loaded system of the RoP if a party submits additional evidence of an already stated fact or submitted argument for which other evidence had already been submitted, but which was disputed by the other party. International Jurisdiction UPC. UPC’s jurisdiction is not confined to its own territory (Article 34 UPCA). UPCA is expressly not limited to European patents insofar as validated for the UPC territory only. As such, European patents validated in territories outside the UPC territory is ‘matter governed by the UPCA’. Art. 24(3) UPCA specifically leaves open the possibility that there is a need for the UPCA to apply national law, including that of non-contracting States (Article 24(3) UPCA) The use of ‘in particular’ makes clear that the areas of application of such foreign law is not limited to the matters referred to in the articles mentioned. No forum non-convenience (Article 4 Br I bis) Where a court has jurisdiction under Article 4 Br I bis because the defendant is domiciled in its territory, […], the Regulation precludes that court from declining jurisdiction on the ground that a court of a non-Member State would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action, even if the jurisdiction of no other Member State is in issue, or the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Member State. Accepting jurisdiction in infringement action vis-à-vis a defendant domiciled in the UPC’s territory based on Art. 4 Br I bis as such cannot be considered contrary to the TRIPS Agreement. Accepting jurisdiction […] must be distinguished from how this jurisdiction is subsequently exercised by the Court in view of all the circumstances of the case. Exercising International Jurisdiction. A court having jurisdiction to hear an alleged infringement of a patent validated outside its territory, is required to apply the law applicable to that patent and must also apply international law principles such as comity. Where the Court has jurisdiction to decide on the alleged infringement and remedies, based on a non-UPC designation of a European patent (EP), and where the defendant has as a defence – asserted that the EP relied on is invalid (Article 24(4) Brussels I Bis, Article 22(4) Lugano Convention) then: [...] The Court of Appeal considers the following approach regarding actions based on EU/LC European patents and/or non-EU/LC European patents to be in line with BSH v Electrolux and international principles of law, including comity, for the following situations (I, II and III respectively):) I – when a revocation action lodged with the Court with respect to (a) EU/LC EP(s) and/or non-EU/LC EP(s): the Court shall declare that it lacks jurisdiction to decide the action. II- in an infringement action which is also based on (a) EU/LC EP(s) and/or non-EU/LC EP(s), and the patent in force in the UPC territory is considered invalid, but the attacked embodiment or process would infringe if it were valid [...] III - in an infringement action which is also based on (a) EU/LC EP(s) and/or non-EU/LC EP(s), and the patent in force in the UPC territory is considered valid and infringed in the UPC territory[...]. Jurisdiction of the UPCA under Art. 32.1(a) UPCA to hear actions for infringement extends to allegations of joint tortfeasorship (Article 32.1(a) UPCA, Article 63 UPCA ,Article 25 UPCA). An "infringer" within the meaning of Art. 63 UPCA in conjunction with Art. 25 UPCA is also a person who does not personally carry out the acts referred to in Art. 25 UPCA but to whom the acts of a third party are attributable because he is an accessory.
IPPT20260513, UPC CoA, Huawei v Quinn Emanuel
Application for discretionary review granted (R. 220.3 RoP; R. 333 RoP, R. 262 RoP) because the question of whether the rapporteur’s decision regarding access under R. 262 RoP is subject to review by the panel pursuant to R 333 RoP, and whether and how an appeal may be lodged against that decision, raises fundamental legal issues which must be clarified by the Court of Appeal. No determination on admissibility of appeal (R. 220.2 RoP) Neither this order nor the reference in this order to R. 220.2 RoP can be regarded as an acknowledgement by the Court of Appeal that an appeal under R. 220.2 RoP is admissible in the present case. This issue is the subject of the appeal proceedings concerning the contested decision.
IPPT20260508, UPC CoA, Adobe v Keeex
Request for discretionary review dismissed (R. 220.3 RoP). The fundamental legal question underlying the request has been clarified by the Court of Appeal in its order of 13 March 2026 [between the same parties] . The Court of Appeal ruled that, where the UPC has jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(2) of Regulation 1215/2012 as the court of the place where the damages occurred or threaten to occur, said article does not provide jurisdiction for infringement in non-member states of the UPC. The order of the Court of Appeal, which was handed down in proceedings between the parties and concerning the patent at issue, conclusively settles the legal issue or question. Uniform application of R. 334(h) RoP: As far as the Appellants refer to the necessity for a uniform application of R. 334(h) RoP, this argument also fails. Their request for a review of discretion does not suggest that various divisions of the Court of First Instance take fundamentally different approaches when exercising their respective discretion.
IPPT20260506, UPC CoA, Lepu v Occlutech
Withdrawal of appeal by party consent (R. 265 RoP). Appellant ordered to bear the respondent’s costs. As a general rule, in the event of a withdrawal of an appeal, the appellant shall be considered to be the unsuccessful party and shall bear the costs incurred in relation to the appeal proceedings
IPPT20260430, UPC CoA, Adobe v KEEEX
Appeal from security for costs order (R. 158 RoP) inadmissible in the absence of a leave to appeal (R. 220.2 RoP). Appeals against security for costs orders require prior authorisation from the CFI unless brought with the final decision. A general reference to appeal provisions does not constitute permission to appeal. There was indeed an error in the CFI’s judgment (The CFI wrongly indicated the appeal route as being via R. 220.1 RoP). Parties cannot rely on such errors where they are aware of them. Appellant recognised that R. 220.2 applied. Proceeding without leave was a conscious procedural choice and a failure attributable to the appellant. For the sake of completeness, the claimant’s relative financial position compared with that of the defendant does not constitute a criterion.
IPPT20260428, UPC CoA, Optopol v Topcon
Request for discretionary review by Court of Appeal dismissed of retroactive extension of time period for lodging Reply (R. 220.3 RoP, R. 29(a) RoP, R. 9.3(a) RoP). Impugned order not manifestly incorrect. The LD dismissed the application for re-establishment of rights pursuant to R. 320 RoP and used its discretion to retroactively extend the time period for lodging the Reply based on R. 9.3(a) RoP. The LD did not exceed its discretionary powers in coming to this decision. Understandable and reasonable finding of excusable human error based on conclusion that a system of checks had been put into place within the representatives’ law firm and that despite this system, the deadline was missed by a human error, in particular by the assistant of Respondent’s representatives incorrectly noting the prescribed time period in the system on which the Respondent’s representatives relied. Moreover, when exercising its discretion, the LD correctly considered that the extension of the time period would not cause any delay in the proceedings.
IPPT20260428, UPC CoA, FAKRO v Dolle
Appeal stayed at joint request of the parties (R. 295(d) RoP) to facilitate a pending settlement and avoid unnecessary deadlines
IPPT20260428, UPC CoA, Suinno v Microsoft
Application to revoke security for costs order rejected (Article 69(4) UPCA, R. 158 RoP, R. 336 RoP). Article 69(4) UPCA does not only apply to cases referred to in Art. 59-62 UPCA. […]. Nor does Art. 69(4) UPCA suggest that the requirement to provide security for costs should be the exception. The purpose of security for costs under Art. 69(4) UPCA is to protect the opposing party from difficulties in enforcing a claim for reimbursement of costs. There are no concerns regarding the security order under the Enforcement Directive. No basis for referral to CJEU (Article 21 UPCA). For there to be jurisdiction, the request for a preliminary ruling must concern a rule of EU law other than the Charter applicable to the case in the main proceedings. It is beyond reasonable doubt that the EU law, the Enforcement Directive and TRIPS agreement, do not prevent the imposition of a security for costs order. For this reason alone, a referral to the CJEU is out of the question. No extension of deadline for providing security (R. 9.3 RoP). Although the Court has the power to revoke or amend an order for security for costs under R. 335 RoP, applicants cannot usually rely on the Court granting an application for revocation or amendment.
IPPT20260427, UPC CoA, Niche v Onward
Withdrawal of application for the assessment of costs permitted, without need to hear the respondent. The application has not yet been served on the respondent (R. 265 RoP, R. 151 RoP)
IPPT20260424, UPC CoA, Polytechnik v Dall Energy
Suspensive effect of appeal from order to produce evidence rejected (R. 223 RoP, R. 190 RoP, R. 262A RoP). The appeal is not devoid of purpose: a succesfull appeal would result in the exclusion of the produced documents from the evidentiary record. The impugned Order must be clearly construed as meaning that only the Claimant’s representatives and their legal team are authorized to access the confidential information specified therein and that these representatives and their legal team are prohibited from sharing the confidential information with the Claimant. No breach of fundamental procedural rights. The system of procedural rules governing proceedings before the UPC follows the principle that all facts and evidence must be adduced to the proceedings as early as possible, ideally during the written procedure. This is also intended to ensure the fair conduct of the proceedings by enabling all parties to be fully informed of the facts and arguments forming the subject-matter of the dispute.
IPPT20260421, UPC CoA, Merz v Viatris
CFI decision set aside: provisional measures granted. Invalidity defence in proceedings for provisional measures does not require a counterclaim for revocation and is not a separate action (R. 25.1 RoP, R. 205 RoP). Similarly, a waiver of an invalidity defence in proceedings for provisional measures is not an application to change the claim or amend the case in the meaning of R. 263 RoP, nor is it a withdrawal in the sense of R. 265 RoP. Admission of new evidence in appeal (R. 222.2 RoP). New evidence admitted to challenge factual assumptions made by the CFI. Public legal materials admitted despite belatedness: the Court of Appeal exercises its discretion here and admits exhibits 226-228 in the proceedings. These exhibits are relevant and the Court of Appeal would have been unhindered to inform itself of these orders.Exhibints 229, 230 and 231 (e-mail correspondence between Viatris Santé and CEPS) are disregarded due to belatedness and lack of relevance. Imminent infringement (Article 62 UPCA, R. 211.2 RoP) and undue delay (R. 211.4 RoP). There is no need to determine in this case whether awareness of an imminent infringement also sets the clock in motion for the calculation of delay within the meaning of R. 211.4 RoP caused by an actual infringement. This is because there is insufficient support for the view that Merz was aware or should have been aware of any imminent infringement. Necessity and balance of interests (Article 62.2 UPCA, R. 211.3 RoP). Concluded that the patients’ interests of continuous supply cannot be expected to be jeopardized by a provisional injunction. The short time left before SPC 033 expires does not speak against provisional measures, especially since this is due to a reversal of the order of the Local Division on appeal.
IPPT20260417, UPC CoA, Guardant v Sophia
Leave to appeal a cost decision granted (R. 221.3 RoP). Decision should have been issued after Guardant had access to the unredacted version of the application and exhibit SG106, and had the opportunity to comment on them. Request to join the appeal with the pending appeal on the merits refused (R. 340 RoP). The assessment of costs is the subject of a specific and separate procedure (R.150 et seq. RoP), which also includes a specific appeal procedure in accordance with R.157 and R. 221 RoP. According to R.221.4 RoP., if leave to appeal a cost decision is granted, the standing judge shall decide the appeal.
IPPT20260417, UPC CoA, Abbott v Sinocare
Preliminary injunction granted in appeal (R. 211 RoP, R. 242 RoP). Claim construction (Article 69 EPC). Claim 1 only requires that the monitored glucose levels and the event data icons are included in the same timeline graph. The claim does not require both to be in the same area of the graph or within a certain range of one another. Obviousness attack in proceedings for provisional measures requires substantiated argumentation (R. 24 RoP, R. 211 RoP, Article 56 EPC). A defendant who raises an obviousness attack in proceedings for provisional measures must substantiate why it considers it more likely than not that the patent will be held invalid based on the submitted prior art. This requires substantiated argumentation and not merely submitting a multitude of documents and quoting a few isolated sentences from each of these documents without explaining why a skilled person would make this combination and how the invention would be obtained in an obvious manner from this combination. Assessment of inventive step and non-technical features (Article 56 EPC). A claim feature should not be excluded from the assessment of inventive step merely because it is a non-technical feature, i.e. a feature which, on its own, would be considered a “non-invention” under Art. 52(2) EPC. A feature that is non-technical as such may still contribute to the technical character of the claimed invention as a whole by its interaction with the other claim features. Therefore, the interrelationship and functioning of the claim features must be assessed together […]. No direct infringement (Article 25 UPCA). It is undisputed between the parties that Respondents do not sell or offer to sell receiver units (mobile phones) according to feature 1.4. As a result, the Respondents do not directly infringe claim 1 of the patent (Art. 25 (a) UPCA). The Respondents have also not been shown to directly infringe claim 14 (Art. 25 (b) UPCA). They have not been shown to use the patented process themselves, or to have offered the process in an infringing manner, i.e. by offering the patented process under the conditions of Art. 25 (b) UPCA for other than private and non-commercial use by diabetes patients (Art. 27 (a) UPCA). Indirect infringement by Respondent 2 by offering and supplying to diabetes patients for their private and non-commercial use (Article 26 UPCA). In its brochures, via its website and at various exhibitions, Respondent 2 has promoted and sold the Sensor Assembly and the On-Body Device of the GlucoMen iCan in the UPC territory for use together with the iCan App to be installed on the users’ mobile phones. Indirect infringement by Respondent 1 (i) by active involvement in the marketing and (ii) as someone to whom the acts of Respondent 2 are attributable as instigator, accomplice or accessory because of its strategic partnership with Respondent 2 (Article 26 UPCA, Article 63 UPCA). Scope of preliminary injunction (Article 62 UPCA, R. 211.1(a) RoP). Provisional injunction not extended to the earlier Sinocare iCan and its software application which has been on the market since October 2023 and against which Appellant has not acted prior to the institution of these proceedings. Generally worded injunction generally justified and has the benefit that if, for example, the infringing product is slightly changed without altering the technical features that are decisive for the technical teaching of the patent, or similar products would be introduced on the market under a different name, these products are covered by the issued injunction. Injunction limited to UPC territory (except Romania) for which jurisdiction has been accepted (Article 34 UPCA). No grace period of one month in view of the contemplated design around. The Application was filed in June 2025, which provided sufficient time to the Respondents to perform the necessary preparations for the launch of a potential design around (the details of which were not provided by the Respondents). Inadmissible cross-appeal (R. 220.1 RoP, R. 237 RoP). Pursuant to R. 220.1 RoP, only a party adversely affected by a decision may lodge an appeal. The same applies to a cross-appeal pursuant to R. 237 RoP. A cross-appeal is inadmissible if the only purpose of the cross-appeal is to change (a certain part of) the reasoning of the Court in First Instance, which in its result is in favour of the party filing the cross-appeal. That is the case here. The assessment whether the requirements of urgency have been fulfilled is a necessary part of the appeal. This same issue cannot form the subject of the cross-appeal. The cross-appeal should therefore be declared inadmissible and the Respondents shall bear the costs of the cross-appeal.
IPPT20260416, UPC CoA, Belkin v Philips
Request for extension of time period for filing Statement of appeal which has not yet started rejected (R. 9.4 RoP, R. 224.1(a) RoP). It follows from R. 9.4 RoP that the Court shall not extend the time period for the Statement of appeal. It can be left open, whether it follows that after the time period for lodging the Statement of appeal has passed, deficiencies in the notice of appeal lodged within the deadline may be remedied only by means of a formal request pursuant to R. 229.2 RoP. This is because the time limit for lodging an appeal has not yet started in the present case. Time period for lodging a Statement of appeal begins to run only when the Court of First Instance (CFI) issues a decision including the reasons
IPPT20260414, UPC CoA, La Siddhi v Athena Pharma
Request for suspensive effect of security of costs order rejected for lack of exceptional circumstances. (Article 74 UPCA, Article 69 (4) UPCA, Rule 223 RoP, Rule 158 RoP). The applicant did not demonstrate: Manifest error in the decision,Irreversible harm or Violation of fundamental procedural rights.
IPPT20260407, UPC CoA, Suinno v Microsoft
€ 600.000 security for costs to be provided by appellant Suinno (Article 69(4) UPCA). Failure to pay previously awarded costs supports the conclusion that recovery of future costs is at risk. Lack of evidence of sufficient financial resources reinforces the need for security for costs. A counterclaim for revocation remains admissible and autonomous even after the infringement action ends, and does not prevent a request for security. Microsoft’s request for a stay dismissed (R. 295(m) RoP). As a general rule, the financial circumstances of the claimant or appellant do not justify a stay of the proceedings unless the requirements of R. 311.1 or .2 RoP are met. That is fair. Regardless of their financial means, every party has the right to have the proceedings carried out in due time. Deadline to file a Statement of response to the grounds of appeal in the appeal proceedings extended until 19 June 2026 (R. 9.3 (a) RoP). Given the uncertainty as to whether Suinno can provide security for costs and the fact that Suinno has also failed to pay the costs of the infringement proceedings, it is, in this exceptional case, justified to extend the time period for filing the Statement of response, as requested.
IPPT20260403, UPC CoA, Valeo v Bosch
Request for simultaneous interpretation from French to English and vice versa denied. Hearing to be held in English. (Rule 109.2 RoP) Procedural rules must be applied in a flexible and balanced manner, with the requisite degree of discretion. An official representative of the Respondents not having command of the language of the proceedings does not constitute sufficient justification. Simultaneous interpretation would offer no advantage over conducting the hearing in English as the Court, parties and representatives have a good command of both French and English
IPPT20260330, UPC CoA, Amazon v InterDigital
A party or its representative may prepare a private transcript of an oral hearing, based on an audio recording pursuant R. 115 RoP.
IPPT20260330, UPC CoA, Sinocare v Abbott
Jurisdiction (Article 31 UPCA). By not contesting the jurisdiction and competence of the Court in First Instance, the Appellant (Defendant in first instance) has in principle foregone this opportunity on appeal and cannot raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction and competence as a ground for overturning the impugned order (Article 26(1) Brussels I Recast and R. 19.7 RoP). […] by manufacturing, preparing and selling its GlucoMen iCan products intended for the European market, the likelihood of damage arose from the possibility of third parties obtaining these products in the Contracting Member States, including in the Netherlands. This provides basis for accepting jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 71(b)(2) and Art. 7(2) BR. Review first instance procedural errors in appeal (Article 73 UPCA). The Appellants have not shown that any of the alleged procedural errors resulted in an incorrect decision by the LD. This is for the Appellants to demonstrate and already for this reason, the alleged procedural errors cannot result in setting aside the Order. Definition of skilled person is a question of law (Article 56 EPC). The definition of a skilled person is a question of law, not a statement of fact. Claim construction (Article 69 EPC. R. 171.2 RoP). Claim construction is a matter of law, not a matter of fact […]. R. 171.2 RoP is therefore not applicable here. In general, a claim is not limited to the embodiments described in the patent. Embodiments are included in the patent description to explain and clarify the claimed invention, not to limit the claim to the specifics of the described embodiment. New submission in appeal on added matter refused (R. 222.2 RoP, Article 138(1)(c) EPC). When exercising its discretion, the Court of Appeal can take into account the justification by the party bringing forward the new submission and the relevance of the new submission for the decision in appeal. Although the Appellants were not aware of the reasoning of the LD when preparing their Objection in first instance, they were aware of Respondent’s position that claim 1 also covers a seal that encloses only one side of the contacts portion. The LD has generally accepted this view and merely refers to claims 4 and 5 as a confirmation of this interpretation. Sufficient disclosure (Article 138(1)(b) EPC). The test to be applied is whether the skilled person is able to reproduce the claimed subject matter on the basis of the patent without any inventive effort and without undue burden. An invention is sufficiently disclosed if the patent specification shows the skilled person at least one way – and in case of functional features: one technical concept – of performing the claimed invention. Inventive step – no incentive and no pointer (Article 56 EPC). The skilled person had no incentive to adapt the sensor system of US833 and had no pointer to adjust this system to obtain the patented sensor system with the advantages described in the patent at issue. Provisional measures – no unreasonable delay (R. 211 RoP, R. 206.2(d) RoP). Unreasonable delay: the time limit within the meaning of R. 211.4 RoP is to be calculated from the date on which the applicant became aware, or should have become aware, of the infringement that would enable him, in accordance with R. 206.2 RoP, to file an application for provisional measures with a reasonable prospect of success. Thus, the decisive point in time is when the applicant has, or should have had, after exercising due diligence, the necessary facts and evidence to establish infringement within the meaning of R. 206.2(d) RoP. The patent was granted on 4 June 2025 and obtained unitary effect on 18 June 2025. The Application was filed one month after the grant of the patent and about two weeks after obtaining unitary effect. This in and of itself already shows that the Respondent acted swiftly after obtaining (unitary) patent protection. Why provisional measures are necessary (R. 206.2(c) RoP). Provisional measures will be necessary, for instance, where any delay would cause irreparable harm to the patent holder. Irreparable harm is, however, not a necessary condition for the ordering of provisional measures. The necessity of provisional measures may also follow from the fact that there is direct competition between the attacked embodiment and the product of the patent holder. In those cases, granting provisional measures may be justified if they are necessary in order to maintain the status quo that existed immediately prior to the alleged infringement until the decision of the Court on the merits. The necessity for provisional measures may arise in a move from a market situation where only one product is available to one where there are two such competing products. Such a move can be expected to lead not just to price pressure but to a permanent price erosion. Generally worded injunction (Article 62(1) UPCA, R. 211.1(a) RoP). Absent specific circumstances, in case infringement is held to exist with respect to a particular embodiment, a generally worded injunction may be issued. This is generally justified and has the benefit that if, for example, the infringing product is slightly changed or similar products would be introduced on the market under a different name, these products are covered by the issued injunction. With the clarification by the Respondent that the Sinocare iCan i3 is not covered by the preliminary injunction, there is no enforcement or other risk that would justify deviating from the general approach to issue a generally worded injunction in case of patent infringement.
IPPT20260330, UPC CoA, Rematec v Europe Forestry
Application filed with the Court of Appeal for the determination of costs dismissed. (R. 150 RoP). Proceedings for cost determination under R. 150 ff. RoP must be initiated before the Court of First Instance (-=CFI), even where they relate to appeal costs. This also applies where the application relates exclusively or in part to the costs of the appeal proceedings.
IPPT20260327, UPC CoA, Onward v Niche
Appeal dismissed of rejection of provisional measures (Article 62 UPCA, R. 206 RoP, R. 211 RoP). Admissibility of auxiliary requests in provisional measures proceedings (R. 30 RoP, R. 222 RoP). Asserting a patent in an amended (non-granted) form is not automatically inadmissible and depends on the circumstances of the case. Whether such amended claims are suitable is assessed in light of the expedited and limited nature of preliminary injunction proceedings. Parties may file auxiliary requests, but their admissibility depends on procedural rules and timing. The admission of new (auxiliary) requests in appeal proceedings is subject to the court’s discretion under R. 222 RoP. Claim interpretation (Article 69 UPCA). Even though not linked by the word ‘and’ the pattern as claimed requires both (at least one) spatial component and (at least one) temporal component to be present. However, the mention of both components, the use of the word ‘comprise’ and the clause in feature 6.2 relating to the temporal component, which refers to the previously described (at least one) spatial component, make it clear that both components are essential for characterising a design.” Direct Infringement (Article 25 UPCA) requires that all claim features are present when the product is offered or marketed. The accused device was only programmed later by medical professionals, so the required features were not present at the relevant time. Uncertain that users will configure the system in an infringing way. Indirect infringement (Article 26 UPCA). Intended use: The intended use pursuant may be determined and presumed on the basis of objective circumstances if such circumstances exist that allow for the sufficiently certain conclusion that the product offered or delivered is intended to be used by the recipient of the offer or the recipient of the delivery for the purpose of utilizing the invention. Insufficient evidence that users intended or were instructed to use the product in an infringing way. Intended use can be inferred from objective circumstances such as instructions, product design, or actual use. The manuals did not clearly teach or recommend an infringing configuration. The device could be used in non-infringing ways, weakening any inference of intent.
IPPT20260327, UPC CoA, NUC v Hurom
Finding of infringement set aside (Article 25 UPCA). Functional claim interpretation “housing longitudinally fixed to an upper side of drive unit, so as to […]” (Article 69 EPC). According to the wording of the claim, the feature according to which the housing has to be longitudinally fixed to an upper side of the drive unit shall be considered in conjunction with the specified function claimed therein, [...]. It follows that the longitudinal fixation of the housing to an upper side of the drive unit not only requires the housing to be assembled or positioned in a longitudinal direction. It further requires, unlike assessed by the CFI (impugned decision, para. 76), that the fixation prevents vertical lifting of the housing or the screw against the drive unit, thus encompassing a fixation against vertical lifting. No infringement because feature [1N] is not fully implemented by the attacked embodiment (Article 25 UPCAA). HUROM has not established that the housing is connected to the drive unit by way of a longitudinal fixation which may prevent the housing from being moved away from the drive unit when pressing, grinding and extracting juice from material put into the inlet port. No tacit acceptance of jurisdiction, notwithstanding R. 19.7 RoP (Article 26 Brussels I regulation) by contesting jurisdiction in first defence, without having filed a preliminary objection. “Entering appearance” (Article 26 Brussels I regulation) is only when the defendant lodges its first statement, by filing a Preliminary objection pursuant to R. 19 RoP as to the issues listed in R. 19.1 and .4 RoP or, if not, the Statement of defence pursuant to R. 23 ff. RoP as to the substance of the dispute, that he will have deliberately chosen or contested the international jurisdiction of the court seized instead of the court which would normally have jurisdiction under the provisions laid down in the Brussels Regulation.
IPPT20260325, UPC CoA, Sanofi & Regeneron v Amgen
IPPT20260324, UPC CoA, Amgen v Sanofi & Regeneron
Withdrawal of appeal by party consent (Rule. 265.1 RoP).
IPPT20260324, UPC CoA, Alpina Coffee v CUP&CINO
Request for suspensive effect rejected due to lack of exceptional circumstances (Article 74 UPCA, Rule 223.1 RoP). Appellant has not argued that the decision is manifestly flawed, or that the decision is based on a breach of a fundamental procedural right. In the application for suspensive effect, appellant does not address the contested decision and/or the proceedings before the Local Chamber at all. Possible future developments such as outcomes of parallel proceedings cannot justify suspensive effect. The possibility of additional infringements or parallel findings cannot justify delaying enforcement.
IPPT20260324, UPC CoA, Applicant v Amycell
Inadmissible second application for suspensive effect (R. 223 RoP). The principle that parties shall set out their full case as early as possible in the proceedings (RoP, Preamble, paragraph 7, last sentence) also applies to applications for suspensive effect. This means that an application for suspensive effect must set out all the reasons, facts, evidence and arguments on which the applicant wishes to rely. Any subsequent application for suspensive effect will be inadmissible, unless the applicant can demonstrate that the new application is based on submissions that could not reasonably have been made in the previous application.
IPPT20260318, UPC CoA, EOFlow v Insulet
Trade secrets or other confidential information ae no longer trade secrets or other confidential information if they are disclosed to the other party without an order pursuant to R. 262A RoP, or without any other restriction, for example an agreement between the parties or a voluntary undertaking. A request under R. 262.2 RoP does not automatically lead to protection against the other party disclosing the information. Only a R. 262A RoP application allows the Court to restrict the use of confidential information by the other party. Once the information has been communicated by serving the briefs without any restriction (….), it is no longer confidential.
IPPT20260316, UPC CoA, Vivo v Sun Patent
The Court of First Instance has case management discretion to either decide on the Preliminary objection as soon as practicable or decide to deal with the Preliminary objection in the main proceedings (R. 19 RoP, R. 20 RoP, R. 102.1 RoP, R. 331.1 RoP). The decision to deal with the Preliminary objection in the main proceedings may be taken either by the judge-rapporteur, as laid down in R. 20.2 RoP, or by the panel if the judge-rapporteur has decided to refer the matter to the panel to decide. R. 102.1 RoP on the interim procedure shall apply applies mutatis mutandis to the written procedure where the judge-rapporteur, after his assignment to the case by the presiding judge pursuant to R. 18 RoP, is likewise tasked with the management of the case, including case management decisions or orders relating to a Preliminary objection. Limited review in appeal (Article 73 UPCA) Considering that the CFI has a margin of discretion […] the review by the Court of Appeal is limited. If, within this limited scope of review, it is established that the CFI erred in using its discretion, for example by misusing or exceeding its discretion, the order must be set aside. The LD Paris has not misused or exceeded its margin of discretion in deciding to defer the decision on the admissibility of claim A.II (FRAND) of the SoC to the main proceedings. There are sound reasons of case management efficiency for the admissibility of claim A.II to be dealt with in the main proceedings. Follows from Statement of claim that the claimed determination of a FRAND offer is only incidental or dependant on infringement.
IPPT20260316, UPC CoA, Ecovacs v Roborock
Revocation of ex parte inspection order confirmed. Duty to disclose any known material fact which might influence the Court (R. 192.3 RoP). Is there so that the Court can take due account of the interests of both parties, in spite of having to rely only on the facts presented in the Application. Representatives are generally obliged not to misrepresent facts (R. 284 RoP). Imposes a heightened requirement where the applicant must disclose, and not leave out, any material facts that might be relevant for an ex parte order. This includes (for example) facts that may be relevant for the proportionality assessment. Ex tunc review: Omissions and distorted accounts of material facts which might be of central importance for the Local Division’s assessment on whether to allow the request at all cannot be compensated or circumvented by later submissions. The possibility that other grounds might have existed cannot retroactively justify the Application. Facts introduced later by the applicant in support of the Application shall be disregarded on review. Proportionality of ex parte preservation of evidence (R. 1971. RoP). When R. 197.1 RoP is applied, it entails a proportionality test in the strict sense; meaning that a balancing is conducted with reference to the facts of the case. This involves weighing opposing interests. The weighing will normally come down to determining whether the requests are within a meaningful range, or if the operative part of the order must be limited in relation to what is requested to ensure proportionality. In rare cases this could result in denying the measures altogether, for example if the evidence to be preserved can be obtained in a less intrusive manner, rendering the sought measures disproportionate. Similarly, requests that are of a more speculative nature (fishing expeditions) in relation to the reasonably available evidence in support of the claim that the patent has been infringed or is about to be infringed, should be denied. Subject matter of appeal (R. 222.1 RoP). As regards submissions in other proceedings, such as proceedings on the merits, the Court is under no obligation to consult other casefiles. No CJEU referral possible (Article 21 UPCA). The UPC cannot ask the CJEU to interpret the UPCA or the RoP. A request for a preliminary ruling must concern the interpretation or validity of EU law, not the interpretation of rules of national law or issues of fact raised in the proceedings. The RoP are procedural rules that can be equated with national procedural law in this respect.
IPPT20260313, UPC CoA, Adobe v Keeex
Preliminary objection granted: Jurisdiction of UPC under Article 7 BR limited to UPC territory. France as place of harmful event / where infringement is likely to occur (Article 7 BR, Article 33(1)(a) UPCA). The Court of Appeal already clarified that the "place where the infringement occurred or is likely to occur" referred to in Art. 33(1)(a) UPCA should be interpreted in the same way as the place "where the harmful event occurred or is likely to occur" referred to in Article 7(2) BR. Where the damage is allegedly caused via a website, these provisions do not require that the website be intended for users located in the territory of the Member States concerned, but simply that it be accessible within the jurisdiction of the court or division seised . Jurisdiction of the UPC (as a common court) with regard to defendants domiciled outside of the EU is governed by the Brussels Regulation pursuant to Article 71b(2) BR. The Statement of claim must contain sufficient facts and submissions to establish internal and international jurisdiction of the Court (R. 13 RoP, R. 19 RoP)). In particular, where the claimant requests that the Court exercise its jurisdiction over the territory of States that are not members of the UPCA, the Statement of claim must contain the facts and legal arguments necessary to justify the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 71b(3) BR. Jurisdiction of UPC under Article 7 BR limited to UPC territory. On the basis of Article 7(2) BR the UPC only has jurisdiction to hear cases concerning damage occurring in its territory, which is the only link between the court seised and the subject matter of the dispute.
IPPT20260311, UPC CoA, Menarini v Hoffmann La Roche
Withdrawal of appeal by party consent (Rule. 265.1 RoP).
IPPT20260310, UPC CoA, Angelalign v Align Technology
Failure to meet a time period for submitting a written statement in ongoing proceedings is governed by R. 9.3(a) RoP, (R. 220.3 RoP). R. 320 RoP is relevant if a time limit is missed that relates either to completely new proceedings or to applications made after the conclusion of proceedings, such as the initiation of appeal proceedings, new proceedings on the merits, applications for the assessment of damages, challenges to decisions declaring appeals inadmissible or objections to default judgments. Even after a deadline has been missed, request for an extension of the timeline can be submitted and the time period can be extended retroactively (R. 9.3(a) RoP). The fact that the Local Division considered it sufficient that the submission of the incorrect reply was based on human error is not objectionable given the circumstances of the present case. This cannot be considered a manifest error.
IPPT20260306, UPC CoA, Dyson v Dreame
Cross border jurisdiction of the UPC for Spain follows from the fact that Eurep is domiciled in a Contracting Member State of the UPCA, namely Germany (Article 4 Brussels, Article 71b(1) Brussels”). Jurisdiction pursuant to these provisions is not limited to acts of the defendant within the UPC Territory. The connection with the UPC Territory is established by the domicile of the defendant, and not the location where the acts of the defendant occurred. Accordingly, contrary to the view expressed by Dreame and the Hamburg Local Division, it is not necessary to examine the plausibility of any acts committed by Eurep in Spain for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction in respect of Eurep. Court of Appeal refers questions to the CJEU regarding - jurisdiction under Article 8 Brussels Regulation over a defendant domiciled in a third state (China) concerning infringement in a non-UPC EU Member State (Spain) and co-defendant Eurep, an alleged intermediary whose services are used to infringe, - jurisdiction under Article 71b(2), second sentence regarding provisional measures against a defendant domiciled in a third state (China) concerning infringement in both a non-UPC EU Member State (Spain) and UPC Contracting Member States when offering the same products in all those EU Member States through websites that are identical apart from the language,- Impact of Article 9(1)(a) of the Enforcement Directive
IPPT20260306, UPC CoA, Black Sheep v HL Display
Withdrawal of appeal by party consent (Rule. 265.1 RoP)
IPPT20260303, UPC CoA, BEGA v Washtower
Withdrawal of appeal by party consent (Rule. 265.1 RoP)
IPPT20260304, UPC CoA, Hurom v NUC
Request for further exchange of written pleadings rejected (R. 36 RoP). New arguments on inventive steps […] have been raised by NUC in response to the new Auxiliary Requests brought for the first time by HUROM with the Grounds of Appeal and could consequently not have been submitted at an earlier stage. HUROM has been waiting for two months following the filing of the Statement of Response until it lodged the R. 36 RoP application for further exchange of written submissions on 22 February 2026, while it knew, according to the order of the judge-rapporteur of 20 October 2025, that following the filing of the Statement of response in this appeal, the appeal proceedings were expected to be ready for oral hearing. The parties will have the opportunity to further comment on each other’s positions from a legal perspective at the oral hearing.
IPPT20260227, UPC CoA, Sibio v Abbott
Request rejected for further exchange of written submissions, following reference in Statement of response to auxiliary requests already submitted in the first instance (R. 36 RoP, R. 222 RoP). The Auxiliary Requests must be considered to be part of the appeal proceedings, until and unless indicated otherwise (e.g. by a withdrawal). In a situation where the CFI did not need to decide on Auxiliary Requests, Appellant still has to address them if it wants to add anything to what was already submitted at first instance. Not allowing further pleadings is not contrary to the principles of due process, in particular the principles of fairness, equity and the right to be heard
IPPT20260226, UPC CoA, EOFlow v Insulet
Under R. 220.3 RoP, discretionary review is only possible when a timely application within 15 days for leave for appeal is made to and rejected by the CFI. Auxiliary request for CoA to grant leave for appeal inadmissible. Article 73 (2)(b)(ii) UPCA does not empower the Court of Appeal to itself grant leave to appeal . Article 73 (2)(b)(ii) UPCA empowers the Court to grant leave to appeal “within 15 days of the notification of the Court´s decision to that effect”
IPPT20260224, UPC CoA, Gowling v Sumi Agro & Syngenta
Request for public access to the register partially granted (R. 262.1(b) RoP). Reasoned requests to the Registry for written pleadings and evidence, lodged at the Court of First Instance, shall be made to the relevant Division. Similarly, reasoned requests for written pleadings and evidence, lodged at the Court of Appeal, shall be made to the Court of Appeal. The case-file of the case in first instance is not generally relodged at the CoA, meaning that the CoA is not able to grant access to it. A request for written pleadings and evidence must be specified to the greatest extent possible and cannot be made in terms which would require the Court to search and select documents based on relevance criteria set up by the requesting party.
IPPT20260224, UPC CoA, Suinno v Microsoft
Application for rehearing rejected (Article 81(1) UPCA; R. 245 RoP). Only fundamental procedural defects can be the basis for a rehearing. What Suinno has brought forward in its Applications is not sufficient to conclude that the Court of Appeal made an error, let alone one that must be considered a flaw of such a serious nature that it would constitute a fundamental error without which the same decision or order would not have been taken. According to R. 248.1 RoP, an Application for rehearing based on the ground of a fundamental procedural defect is only admissible where an objection in respect of the procedural defect was raised during the proceedings before the Court of First Instance or the Court of Appeal and dismissed by the Court, except where such objection could not have been raised during the proceedings before the Court of First Instance or the Court of Appeal. Non-compliance with order to pay security must lead to default judgment (R. 158.5 RoP). It is only under exceptional circumstances that the Court may derogate from this general rule.
IPPT20260218, UPC CoA, Samsung Bioepis v Alexion
Withdrawal of appeal by party consent (Rule. 265.1 RoP)
IPPT20260218, UPC CoA, Syntorr v Arthrex
Order for security for costs set aside in light of litigation insurance (Article 69(4) UPCA, Rule 158.1 RoP) . Careful consideration of the terms of a litigation insurance policy is of particular relevance to demonstrate the financial position of party. The insurance obtained by the appellant provided adequate security - no obligation to provide further security in the form of a deposit or a bank guarantee. Appelant sufficiently substantiated the validity and the terms of the insurance policy in first instance proceedings.
IPPT20260218, UPC CoA, Guardant Health v Sophia Genetics
Request for suspensive effect for interim cost award rejected: no infringement of fundamental procedural rights and manifest errors (R. 211.1(d) RoP, R. 223 RoP). In general, the Court may assume that the successful party will be entitled to 50% of the applicable ceiling and may order reimbursement of the amount by means of an interim award, unless there are clear indications that the successful party in fact incurred fewer representation costs, or that 50% of the applicable ceiling is more than what would be reasonable or proportionate in the particular circumstances of the case. At the same time, as a general rule, the Court cannot assume that the successful party is entitled to more than 50% of the applicable ceiling before the conclusion of the cost proceedings according to Chapter 5 of Part 1 RoP. An exception may apply if parties have submitted and discussed cost specifications during the proceedings or have agreed on the costs to be reimbursed. Request to set a deadline for paying the interim costs dismissed. There is no legal basis for a request to supplement the first-instance decision in the proceedings for an order suspending the effect of the appeal, by setting a deadline for Guardant to pay the interim award of costs.
IPPT20260217, UPC CoA, Huawei v TP-Link
IPPT20260217, UPC CoA, Huawei v Netgear
Requests for confidentiality made under R. 262.2 RoP must be submitted together with a redacted version and justification together with the document itself. If, on the other hand, a party has not requested under R. 262.2 RoP that certain information in pleadings or evidence be treated as confidential, the member of the public shall, upon application, be granted access under R. 262.1(b) RoP, subject to the protection of personal data, provided that the balancing of interests has been in their favour. The party requesting confidentiality can still submit a request before being heard by the judge rapporteur
IPPT20260217, UPC CoA, Rematec v Europe Forestry
Revocation decision set aside (Article 65 UPCA), infringement found in appeal (Article 25 UPCA). Final decision in appeal (Article 75 UPCA, R. 242.2(b) RoP). The Court of Appeal, must, in order to issue a final decision, as a rule decide not only on the counterclaim for revocation but also render a final decision on the infringement action. That the Court of First Instance failed to decide an issue which it is necessary for the Court of Appeal to decide on appeal does not normally constitute an exceptional circumstance justifying a referral back. Claim interpretation (Article 69 EPC). Insufficient that implementation of the orientation required by feature 1d could theoretically take place, but in fact does not. Actual implementation is decisive (as confirmed by description and drawings). The assumption made by the Court of First instance runs counter to the fact that, under that assumption, the essentially radial orientation of the feed-in and discharge required by feature 1d would be rendered ineffective, thereby depriving essential functional aspects of the feature of their meaning. The term “essentially” indicates that the orientation of the feed-in and discharge to be enabled does not depend on a strictly geometrical understanding; sufficient to enable a configuration in which the grist is fed in and discharged in a direction that is more radial than tangential. Novelty (Article 54 EPC). D3 does not disclose feature 1d: In the mills shown in the aforementioned Figures 3 and 8, the feed-in and/or discharge takes place rather in a tangential direction than in a radial direction, and thus not in an essentially radial direction. Inventive step (Article 56 EPC) There is no suggestion to modify in such a way that, instead of providing an essentially tangential feed-in and discharge, they would enable an essentially radial feed-in and discharge. Lack of legal interest regarding enabling disclosure of dependent claims 6 and 8 (Article 138(1)(b) EPC) since the counterclaim for revocation is already unsuccessful with respect to the independent patent claim 1, to which patent claims 6 and 8 directly and indirectly refer back and which therefore has a scope of protection that also encompasses patent claims 6 and 8. Direct infringement of product claim 1 (Article 25 UPCA). “Offering” must be interpreted autonomously and understood in an economic sense. An “offering” does not have to constitute a legally binding contractual offer. It is sufficient that an item is presented in such a way that a third party could make an offer to acquire it, for example by concluding a contract of sale, lease, or hire - advertising alone can suffice. Infringement exists where the product is suitable for infringing use, even if alternative (non-infringing) configurations exist. Indirect infringement of method claim 15 (Article 26 UPCA). Apparent that the contested mill is suitable for carrying out the method of claim 15. Also applies when it is used in accordance with the information in the Defendant’s brochures and the Defendant, as a specialized company that published the brochure, was also aware of that. Permanent injunction against infringer (Article 63(1) UPCA). The Court must grant a permanent injunction unless there are special reasons for not doing so, which may arise in particular from the general obligations under Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive. Corrective measures and direct infringement – proportionality (Article 25 UPCA, Article 64 UPCA). Following the finding of direct infringement of patent claim 1 by the contested embodiment, corrective measures are ordered, namely the recall and permanent removal of the contested embodiment from the channels of commerce as well as the destruction of the contested embodiment. With regard to the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 64(4) UPCA, it must be clarified that, in order to comply with the order to destroy the contested embodiments in the Defendant’s possession, it is sufficient if the longitudinal bars at the discharge opening that are spaced at least 70 mm apart are replaced with bars spaced below that value. Corrective measures and indirect infringement remains undecided (Article 26 UPCA, Article 64 UPCA). No decision is required, as an order concerning the contested embodiment already results from the direct infringement of patent claim 1. It can therefore remain undecided whether corrective measures pursuant to Article 64 UPCA can be ordered at all in the event of (only) an indirect patent infringement being found and, if so, under what circumstances the ordering of corrective measures in the event of an indirect patent infringement meets the requirement of proportionality pursuant to Article 64(4) UPCA. Publication of the decision (Article 80 UPCA). Such an order also requires the claimant to demonstrate a legitimate interest in the requested publication of the decision at the defendant's expense. In this regard, all circumstances of the individual case must be considered, such as the scope and severity of the infringement, the public presentation of the conflict, the public's interest in information, and whether the publication of the decision can contribute to eliminating misconceptions in the market caused by the infringement or to deterring future infringements.
IPPT20260217, UPC CoA, bioMérieux v Labrador
Request to stay proceedings pending EPO opposition rejected. As a general principle, the Court will not stay proceedings, otherwise, the Court cannot ensure that the final oral hearing will take place within a reasonable time. (R. 295 RoP). An exception to the principle that the Court will not stay revocation proceedings pending opposition proceedings applies when a rapid decision may be expected from the EPO. (Art. 33(10) UPCA, R. 295(a) RoP). The Court has a discretionary power to stay the proceedings when a rapid decision may be expected from the EPO. Whether or not a stay is granted depends on the balance of interests of the parties and the specific circumstances of the case. The fact that the expected EPO decision is not a final decision and is likely to be appealed is one of several factors that may be taken into account
IPPT20260211, UPC CoA, Valeo v Bosch
Appeal against order judge-rapporteur granting preliminary objection but not ending the proceedings admissible under R. 220.1 RoP. (Article 73 UPCA) An order granting a preliminary objection that does not end the proceedings is not a decision granting the preliminary objection in the sense of Rule 21.1 RoP. An order of the judge-rapporteur granting the preliminary objection but not terminating the proceedings in respect of one of the parties is neither a "decision" granting the preliminary objection within the meaning of the first sentence of Rule 21.1 RoP, nor is it an order that "rejects" the preliminary objection within the meaning of the second sentence of Rule 21.1 RoP. In the case of such an order, which does not fall within any of the grounds for appeal referred to in Article 73(1) and 73(2)(a) UPCA or Rule 220.1 of the RoP, the provisions of the second sentence of art. 21.1 of the RoP must apply by analogy. Request for suspensive effect denied (R. 295(m) RoP): translation time following the drafting (in vain) of a submission is not an extraordinary circumstance that justifies suspension of the first instance proceedings.
IPPT20260209, UPC CoA, PAPST Licensing v EPO
Request to grant unitary effect denied (R. 97 RoP). Article 3(1) of Regulation 1257/2012 cannot be interpreted to allow registration of unitary effect for a granted European patent which does not include the designation of one of the participating Member States [Malta]. No justification can be found to allow for Art. 3(1) of Regulation 1257/2012 to be applied contra legem. Request to refer questions to the CJEU denied (acte clair) (Article 20 UPCA). The outcome in the present proceedings is based on a literal reading of Article 3(1) of Regulation 1257/2012
IPPT20260204, UPC CoA, Centripetal Limited v Palo Alto Networks
Request to maintain the Saisie Order to the extent outlined in Exhibit A1 is inadmissible (R. 192 RoP, R. 222.2 RoP). The form in which Centripetal seeks to have the Saisie Order “maintained” […] broadens the scope of the order. The Saisie Order concerned the preservation of evidence at an office located at Rosenheimer Straße 143c in Munich. In the amended form, however, the scope of the order includes documents that are not available at the location of this office. Centripetal seeks the production of documents irrespective of their location. In addition, the detailed descriptions that Palo Alto would be required to provide under requests 1 a) aa) and bb) of the amended request cover a broader – or at least a less clearly defined – category of documents than the technical documentation, internal development records and manuals referred to in the original application. Appellant failed to provide any justification for not submitting the amended request during the first instance proceedings.
IPPT20260204, UPC CoA, EOFlow v Insulet
Appeal against order imposing penalties inadmissible. (Article 69 UPCA, Art. 82(4) UPCA, Rule 354.4 RoP). Appealable decisions (Rule 220 RoP) Orders imposing penalty payments do not fall under Article 73(2)(a) UPCA or Rule 220.1 RoP, an appeal against such orders is only admissible if leave to appeal is granted according to Rule. 220.4 RoP. This clarification is necessary because, unlike the typical procedural orders, this order is not necessarily issued in the course of ongoing proceedings prior to a final decision. It may also be, and typically is, issued after the main proceedings have been concluded. Leave to appeal granted by first instance regarding confidentiality request (Rule 221 RoP) cannot be presumed to extend to the order imposing the penalty. The Legal remedy against a cost order for penalty payments (Article 69 UPCA) is an appeal under R. 220.2 RoP and not an application for leave to appeal against cost decisions according to R. 221 RoP. (Rule 220.2 RoP, Rule 221 RoP). Orders on costs, which concern both, the question of who bears the costs and the amount - are subject to the same legal remedy as the decision on the merits.
IPPT20260203, UPC CoA, Oerlikon v Bhagat
Security for costs in appeal released following settlement (Article 69(4) UPCA, Article 79 UPCA, R. 158 RoP). R.352.2 RoP, which applies to security for enforcement, applied by way of analogy. This provision applies to security for enforcement but should be applied by way of analogy in the present case. There is a reason to do so given the conclusion of the proceedings and the settlement between the parties.
IPPT20260129, UPC CoA, OEFlow v Insulet
No limitation on the use of information received pursuant to a court order to communicate information (Article 67 UPCA, R. 191 RoP.) without a confidentiality request under R. 262A RoP, which applies at least mutatis mutandis. This already follows from the fact that, according to R. 190.1, second sentence, RoP, the Court may for the protection of confidential information, order that the evidence be disclosed to certain named persons only and be subject to appropriate terms of non-disclosure. This is also applicable to communication of information “as is specified in Article 67 of the Agreement” pursuant to R. 191 RoP. The same must apply in cases where the court orders the communication of information pursuant to Art. 67 UPCA. For this reason, EOFlow would have been required to submit a R. 262A RoP application
IPPT20260129, UPC CoA, Alpinestars v Dainese
Withdrawal of request for a discretionary review of order of the Milan LD (R. 220.3 RoP). R. 265 RoP applies to discretionary review requests mutatis mutandis. The withdrawal is permitted after a decision on Alpinestars’ request for a discretionary review became obsolete since the Milan LD, by order of 13 January 2026, amended margin no. 3 of its order of 18 November 2025 and granted leave to appeal.
IPPT20260126, UPC CoA, Merz v Viatris
No restriction on use of Exhibit by other party even though uploaded under the Highly Confidential code (R. 262 RoP, R. 262A RoP). Absent a “confidentiality club” (R. 262A RoP), the Court will not treat a document as potentially containing confidential information in the sense of R. 262A RoP. A request made to prevent public access (R. 262 RoP) does not mean access by the other party will be restricted.
IPPT20260126, President UPC CoA, Petitioner v Registrar
Confirmation of registrar’s rejection of application to be entered on the list of representatives on the basis of R. 12.1 EPLC Rules (grandfather’s clause) after expiration of the one-year transitional period (Article 48(3) UPCA, R. 19 EPLC Rules). Neither the EPLC Rules themselves nor the application of said rules by the Registrar of the UPC violate the principles of equality or are discriminatory.
IPPT20260126, UPC CoA, Luxembourg, Ercison v Asustek
Confidentiality club regime to include a licensing bar R. 262A RoP). Confidentiality club regime: proportionality of measures (R. 262A RoP, Article 9(3) Trade Secrets Directive). When deciding on the measures for the protection of confidential information and assessing their proportionality, the Court must take into account the need to ensure the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the legitimate interests of the parties and, where appropriate, of third parties, and any potential harm for either of the parties, and, where appropriate, for third parties, resulting from the granting or rejection of such measures (cf. Art. 9(3) TSD). Confidentiality club membership for legal persons (R. 262A.6 RoP, Article 9(2) Trade Secrets Directive). A legal person should be able to propose a natural person or natural persons to ensure proper representation of that legal person. Access of that natural person to be determined on the basis of the relevant circumstances of the case, including the role of that person in the proceedings before this Court, the relevance of the confidential information to the performance of that role and the trustworthiness of the person. The fact that a person is an employee of a party is, as a general rule, not sufficient to deny access to that person. Access for a party’s employee will often be essential to ensure compliance with the right of that party to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. aving full access for, at least, one of its employees, as a general rule, outweighs the interests of the applicant, even if imposing a EEO regime would be preferable from the perspective of safeguarding confidentiality. Confidentiality club membership and confidential FRAND licensing details. The fact that employees cannot unlearn information justifies the possibility of a temporary licensing bar preventing these employees from being involved in patent licensing negotiations with the third parties concerned.
IPPT20260126, UPC CoA, Sun v Vivo
Application for ‘External Eyes Only’ confidentiality club rejected (R. 262A RoP). Inadmissible requests by intervener that do not support SUN PATENT’s appeal and requests (R. 313.2 RoP). Requests which go beyond the scope defined by the Court and beyond the mere support of existing requests are inadmissible. Trade Secrets Directive not directly applicable to patent law proceedings before this court (R. 262A RoP). Concerns only the unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure of trade secrets and does not provide for measures to protect the confidentiality of trade secrets in other types of court proceedings. When interpreting R. 262A RoP, the Court of Appeal will use principles similar to the principles underlying the Trade Secrets Directive. Confidentiality club regime: proportionality of measures (R. 262A RoP, Article 9(3) Trade Secrets Directive). When deciding on the measures for the protection of confidential information and assessing their proportionality, the Court must take into account the need to ensure the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the legitimate interests of the parties and, where appropriate, of third parties, and any potential harm for either of the parties, and, where appropriate, for third parties, resulting from the granting or rejection of such measures (cf. Art. 9(3) TSD). Confidentiality club membership for legal persons (R. 262A.6 RoP, Article 9(2) Trade Secrets Directive). A legal person should be able to propose a natural person or natural persons to ensure proper representation of that legal person. Access of that natural person to be determined on the basis of the relevant circumstances of the case, including the role of that person in the proceedings before this Court, the relevance of the confidential information to the performance of that role and the trustworthiness of the person. The fact that a person is an employee of a party is, as a general rule, not sufficient to deny access to that person. Access for a party’s employee will often be essential to ensure compliance with the right of that party to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. aving full access for, at least, one of its employees, as a general rule, outweighs the interests of the applicant, even if imposing a EEO regime would be preferable from the perspective of safeguarding confidentiality. Confidentiality club membership and confidential FRAND licensing details. The fact that employees cannot unlearn information justifies the possibility of a temporary licensing bar preventing these employees from being involved in patent licensing negotiations with the third parties concerned. Liability and penalties for breach of confidentiality club regime (R. 262A RoP). No liability of the UPC representative of a party in the event of a breach of a duty of confidentiality. A penalty payment may be imposed on a party to the proceedings. It does not release said representative from its obligation to ensure that that each member of the legal team is bound by the provisions of the confidentiality order and also does not release him or her from its rights and obligations under the UPC Agreement and the Rules of Procedure. ailing which the Court may exclude said representative from the proceedings by way or order under the conditions set forth under R. 291.1 RoP.
IPPT20260121, UPC CoA, Valeo v Bosch
Respondents invited to submit within seven days comments on the admissibility of an appeal on the basis of R. 220.2 RoP of an order allowing a Preliminary Objection (R. 21 RoP, R. 220 RoP, Article 73 UPCA). Time limit filing Statement of Defence suspended (R. 235 RoP)
IPPT20260116, UPC CoA, Amycel
Suspensive effect appeal rejected (R. 223 RoP). The Applicant has merely claimed that the sending of registered letters (part III of the impugned decision) would be impossible to revert and that the publication of a message on the website of the Applicant (part IV of the impugned decision) would entail "irreversible consequences”, without establishing that the impugned decision is manifestly erroneous. Even if the Court were to accept that the consequences of these orders are not fully reversible, it does not follow that the appeal becomes devoid of purpose in the absence of suspensive effect and that the Applicant's interest in maintaining the status quo until the decision on appeal outweighs Amycel's legitimate interest informing the Applicant’s customers of the decision.
IPPT20260109, UPC COA, Juul Labs v NJOY
Withdrawal of the appeal against revocation permitted, proceedings closed. (Rule. 370 RoP). R. 370.9 (b) RoP has been amended from 1 January 2026, providing for reimbursement of court fees with 50 % in case of the withdrawal of an action before the closure of the written procedure instead of, as previously, 60 %. The entry into force provides that amendments shall enter into force on 1 January 2026. The amendments apply only to those actions and applications filed after 31 December 2025.
IPPT20260106, UPC COA, Angelalign v Align Technology
Request for discretionary review of procedural order dismissed. (Rule 220 RoP). A request for discretionary review can only be allowed after the other party has been heard pursuant to R. 220.4 Rop. If allowed, this sets in motion a procedural appeal under a procedural appeal under R. 220.2 RoP. Giving Align a shorter period to submit its comments to the request , than the time taken by Angelalign is contrary to the principles of proportionality, fairness and equity. The exclusion of arguments and evidence by the CFI is not an error per se. The possibility to disregard late-filed arguments and evidence also applies to proceedings for provisional measures. The requirement to justify a discretionary review in a way that enables the Respondent to prepare its response and enables the CoA to decide without further information is not met .
