2026
Print this pageIPPT20260512, CJEU, Meta Platforms Ireland
Article 15 of the DSM Copyright Directive does not preclude national legislation governing the online use of press publications by platforms which: grants press publishers the right to obtain “fair remuneration” in return for the authorisation to use press publications granted to information society service providers; requires information society service providers to enter into negotiations with press publishers, to make available the information necessary to determine the amount of such fair remuneration, and not to limit the visibility of press publications in search results during the negotiations; empowers a national regulatory authority to define the benchmark criteria for determining that remuneration, to determine the amount of that remuneration where the parties fail to reach agreement, and to impose administrative fines in the event of failure to comply with information obligations; does not deprive press publishers of the possibility of refusing to grant such authorisation or of granting it free of charge, including through non-exclusive free licences; does not impose on information society service providers any payment obligation unrelated to the use of such publications, including where they do not use or intend to use them; therefore imposes obligations and penalties that constitute a limitation on the freedom to conduct a business, but which are justified provided that they contribute to the protection of intellectual property and the freedom and pluralism of the media, and comply with the principle of proportionality.
IPPT20260430, CJEU, GEMA v VHC2Seniorenresidenz
No ‘communication to the public’ in the case of retransmission of broadcasting programmes via the internal cable network of a retirement home. The simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged retransmission of television and radio programmes via the internal cable network of a retirement home to residents’ rooms does not constitute a “communication to the public” within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Copyright Directive 2001. There is no use of a “specific technical means”, since the operator merely retransmits internally, via the retirement home’s cable network, the signal received by its satellite reception system. Nor is there a “new public”, since the residents live permanently in the retirement home and, as owners of reception equipment, receive broadcasts in their private sphere, meaning that they form part of the public taken into account by the rightholders when they authorised the original broadcast. The fact that the retirement home is operated for profit is “not decisive” for the classification of an act as a “communication to the public”. Such an interpretation prevents copyright holders from receiving “undue remuneration”, whereas they have already received “appropriate remuneration” for the original broadcast.
IPPT20260423, CJEU, Ristorazione v Ramazzini
Provisional measures must, at the request of the defendant, be revoked or otherwise cease to have effect if the applicant does not institute proceedings leading to a decision on the merits of the case within the prescribed period. Article 9(5) of Directive 2004/48 applies to all provisional measures referred to in that article and does not preclude provisional measures intended to anticipate the effects of the decision on the merits of the case. That provision ensures that provisional measures do not continue to apply without a decision on the merits of the case and prevents the defendant from being affected by a potentially unjustified measure, which would be contrary to the principle of proportionality as referred to in that directive.
Offline streaming copy does not fall under private copying exception of article 5(2)(b) Directive 2001/29/EC (‘InfoSoc Directive’): Offline streaming functionality must be regarded as communication of a work to the public within the meaning of article 3(1) InfoSoc Directive. Offline streaming copy cannot be classified as a reproduction within the meaning of Article 2 InfoSoc Directive and thus cannot fall within the scope of the private copying exception of Article 5(2)(b) InfoSoc Directive. The offline streaming copy is not made by a natural person since they only have access to the work concerned once the copy thereof has been made by the provider of the streaming service and the source of the copy is held by the provider of the streaming service, not by the natural person concerned. The copyright holder retains control through an encryption method, such that that copy may not be moved, transferred or reproduced by the user, and thus holds the control to block access to that copy. Offline streaming copy does not give right to fair compensation because of normal exploitation: The remuneration arrangements provided for in a licence agreement which authorises the provider of a streaming service to make offline streaming copies on end users’ devices have no bearing on whether those copies are capable of falling within the private copying exception of Article 5(2)(b) InfoSoc Directive. It is only relevant if the copyright holder has retained control over that work by means of technological measures and has given its authorisation for that copy through for example a license, as it is not possible to obtain fair compensation in such a case.
IPPT20260414, CJEU, Pelham II
The pastiche exception is not a catch-all provision for any creative reuse, but requires a recognisable artistic or creative dialogue with an existing work. It covers creations which evoke one or more existing works, while being noticeably different from them, and which use characteristic elements protected by copyright in order to engage with those works in an artistic or creative dialogue that is recognisable as such. That artistic or creative dialogue may take different forms, in particular an overt stylistic imitation of those works, a tribute to them, or humorous or critical engagement with them. While a pastiche may constitute an expression of humour or mockery, this is not a necessary requirement. The use must be overt and recognisable as such, meaning that concealed imitations and plagiarism do not fall within the concept of pastiche. Accordingly, sampling may fall within the pastiche exception where the sample is used for the purpose of creating a work that satisfies those requirements. For use to be “for the purpose” of pastiche, it is sufficient that the pastiche nature is objectively recognisable for a person who is familiar with the existing work from which the elements have been borrowed. It is not necessary to establish that the user intended to use the existing work for the purpose of pastiche.
IPPT20260326, CJEU, Fauré Le Page v Goyard
Trade mark that includes a number which is likely to be perceived as indicating the year of establishment of a business can be deceiving to the public (article 3(1)(g) Directive 2008/95). A number which is perceived by the relevant public as the year of establishment of a business may evoke particular know-how, which is seen as a guarantee of the quality of the product covered by that mark and contributes to bestowing a prestigious image on it. In absence of such quality and image, actual deceit or sufficiently serious risk of deceit may be found. Accordingly, the ground for refusal of registration and invalidity set out in Article 3(1)(g) of Directive 2008/95 cannot be applied in cases where the mark at issue is of such a nature as to deceive the public in relation to a characteristic of its proprietor and not in relation to a characteristic of the goods or services which it covers.
IPPT20260319, CJEU, Călinescu v HK
A critical edition of a work in the public domain may constitute a work protected by copyright. Provided that its author has been able to make free and creative choices capable of conferring originality on that subject matter. The critical edition may, as a whole, constitute a protected work, with the result that it is not necessary to distinguish between its constituent parts (such as the original text, comments, critical notes or explanations) in order to determine which parts are capable of falling within the scope of copyright protection, but that the edition may be protected as a whole provided that it is identifiable with sufficient precision and objectivity. This does not affect the fact that the work remains in the public domain and cannot confer on the author of the critical edition an exclusive right over that pre-existing work.
IPPT20260211, UKSC, Emotional Perception AI v Comptroller General
Patentability of “programs for computer” under (Article 52(2)(c) EPC) . Artifical Neural Networks (ANN) are “programs for computers” . There is no reason to confine the term “computer” to conventional digital computers . It is unreasonable to interpret the EPC in a way that ties its application to a particular technology which happens currently to be prevalent. The description of a “program” must be broadened to include a set of instructions capable of being followed by a computer (of any kind) - which may or may not have a CPU - to produce desired manipulations of data. Software and hardware implementations are the same in terms of the architecture, weights ., and the outputs produced, this is an untenable distinction. It is not relevant that an ANN can be implemented using various different types of physical machines which is “a mere implementation choice”.What matters is the arrangement of artificial neurons, each characterised by its links to other neurons in the network, weights, bias and activation function. The machine on which an ANN is implemented is a computer. What characterises a computer as a physical machine is its functionality, not the specific technology used to achieve that functionality. The ANN - irrespective of whether any of its features are adjustable - represents a set of instructions to the machine to perform operations. The ANN as a whole is a computer program. That is so even in the extreme case of a trained ANN in which the weights and biases have been frozen and incorporated in hardware that can be reproduced by manufacturing identical copies of the same physical circuit of components, just as it is in the case of an ANN in which the weights and biases can be altered. There is no justification for drawing a distinction in law between instructions created by a computer and those created by a human being. Once this is recognised, it cannot make a difference what particular method is used to program a computer to generate instructions which themselves constitute a computer program.
