Financial damage caused by unlawful act in other Member State no reason to appoint 'place where the harmful event occured'

LITIGATION - PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

‘Place where the harmful event occured’ is not the domicile and place where applicant’s assests are concentrated for the sole reason that applicant has suffered financial damage, when this damage is a direct cause of an unlawful act in another Member State
In the present case, the place in a Member state where the damage occured, cannot be regarded as ‘place where the harmful event occured’, when the damage consists exclusively of financial damages that materialises directly in the bank account of the applicant and is the direct result of an unlawful act committed in another Member State.

34. In that context, it should be noted that the term ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ may not be construed so extensively as to encompass any place where the adverse consequences of an event, which has already caused damage actually arising elsewhere, can be felt (judgment of 19 September 1995 in Marinari, C‑364/93, EU:C:1995:289, paragraph 14).
35. In the wake of that case-law, the Court has also held that that expression does not refer to the place where the applicant is domiciled and where his assets are concentrated by reason only of the fact that he has suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of part of his assets which arose and was incurred in another Member State (judgment of 10 June 2004 in Kronhofer, C‑168/02, EU:C:2004:364, paragraph 21).
38. Consequently, purely financial damage which occurs directly in the applicant’s bank account cannot, in itself, be qualified as a ‘relevant connecting factor’, pursuant to Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001. In that respect, it should also be noted that a company such as Universal Music may have had the choice of several bank accounts from which to pay the settlement amount, so that the place where that account is situated does not necessarily constitute a reliable connecting factor.
39. It is only where the other circumstances specific to the case also contribute to attributing jurisdiction to the courts for the place where a purely financial damage occurred, that such damage could, justifiably, entitle the applicant to bring the proceedings before the courts for that place.

The Court seised  must assess all the evidence available when determining its jurisdiction based on Regulation No 44/2001
The Court must include the arguments put forward by the defendant

44. In the particular context of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, the Court has held that, at the stage at which jurisdiction is determined, the court seised does not examine either the admissibility or the substance of the application in the light of national law, but identifies only those points of connection with the State in which that court is sitting that support its claim to jurisdiction under that provision. Thus, the court seised may regard as established, solely for the purpose of ascertaining whether it has jurisdiction under that provision, the applicant’s claims as regards the conditions for liability in tort, delict or quasi-delict (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 October 2012 in Folien Fischer and Fofitec, C‑133/11, EU:C:2012:664, paragraph 50 and of 28 January 2015 in Kolassa, C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 62 and case-law cited).
45. Although the national court seised is not obliged, if the defendant contests the applicant’s claims, to conduct a comprehensive taking of evidence at the stage of determining jurisdiction, the Court has held that both the objective of the sound administration of justice, which underlies Regulation No 44/2001, and respect for the independence of the national court in the exercise of its functions require the national court seised to be able to examine its international jurisdiction in the light of all the information available to it, including, where appropriate, the defendant’s arguments (judgement of 28 January 2015 in Kolassa, C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 64).

IPPT20160616, CJEU, Univeral Music

C-12/15 - ECLI:EU:C:2016:449