IPPT20100701, GCEU, AstraZeneca

Print this page 14-04-2011
IPPT20100701, GCEU, AstraZeneca

COMPETITION LAW

 

Abuse of  a dominant position: unlawfully obtaining exclusive right by submission of misleading information - fines € 52,5 million
• In the present case, the Court observes that the submission to the public authorities of misleading information liable to lead them into error and therefore to make possible the grant of an exclusive right to which an undertaking is not entitled, or to which it is entitled for a shorter period, constitutes a practice falling outside the scope of competition on the merits which may be particularly restrictive of competition. Such conduct is not in keeping with the special responsibility of an undertaking in a dominant position not to impair, by conduct falling outside the scope of competition on the merits, genuine undistorted competition in the common market
• It follows from the objective nature of the concept of abuse (HoffmannLa Roche v Commission, paragraph 239 above, paragraph 91) that the misleading nature of representations made to public authorities must be assessed on the basis of objective factors and that proof of the deliberate nature of the conduct and of the bad faith of the undertaking in a dominant position is not required for the purposes of identifying an abuse of a dominant position.
• The Court would point out that the question whether representations made to public authorities for the purposes of improperly obtaining exclusive rights are misleading must be assessed in concreto and that assessment may vary according to the specific circumstances of each case. In particular, it is necessary to examine whether, in the light of the context in which the practice in question has been implemented, that practice was such as to lead the public authorities wrongly to create regulatory obstacles to competition, for example by the unlawful grant of exclusive rights to the dominant undertaking. In this respect, as the Commission asserts, the limited discretion of public authorities or the absence of any obligation on their part to verify the accuracy or veracity of the information provided may be relevant factors to be taken into consideration for the purposes of determining whether the practice in question is liable to raise regulatory obstacles to competition.
• Moreover, in so far as an undertaking in a dominant position is granted an unlawful exclusive right as a result of an error by it in a communication with public authorities, its special responsibility not to impair, by methods falling outside the scope of competition on the merits, genuine undistorted competition in the common market requires it, at the very least, to inform the public authorities of this so as enable them to rectify those irregularities.
• The Court would also point out, in the light of the applicants’ arguments set out in paragraphs 309, 312 and 314 above, that, although proof of the deliberate nature of conduct liable to deceive the public authorities is not necessary for the purposes of identifying an abuse of a dominant position, intention none the less also constitutes a relevant factor which may, should the case arise, be taken into consideration by the Commission. The fact, relied upon by the applicants, that the concept of abuse of a dominant position is an objective concept and implies no intention to cause harm (see, to that effect, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, paragraph 309 above, paragraph 173) does not lead to the conclusion that the intention to resort to practices falling outside the scope of competition on the merits is in all events irrelevant, since that intention can still be taken into account to support the conclusion that the undertaking concerned abused a dominant position, even if that conclusion should primarily be based on an objective finding that the abusive conduct actually took place.
• Lastly, the mere fact that certain public authorities did not let themselves be misled and detected the inaccuracies in the information provided in support of the applications for exclusive rights, or that competitors obtained, subsequent to the unlawful grant of the exclusive rights, the revocation of those rights, is not a sufficient ground to consider that the misleading representations were not in any event capable of succeeding. As the Commission rightly observes, where it is established that behaviour is objectively of such a nature as to restrict competition, the question whether it is abusive in nature cannot depend on the contingencies of the reactions of third parties.
• Consequently, the Commission applied Article 82 EC correctly in taking the view that the submission to the patent offices of objectively misleading representations by an undertaking in a dominant position which are of such a nature as to lead those offices to grant it SPCs to which it is not entitled or to which it is entitled for a shorter period, thus resulting in a restriction or elimination of competition, constituted an abuse of that position. The question whether those representations were objectively misleading must be assessed in the light of the specific circumstances and context of each individual case. In this case, the factual assessment made by the Commission in this respect is the subject of the second plea.

Start of abuse
• In view of all the foregoing, the Court upholds the first plea in so far as it alleges an error of law by the Commission in its assessment of the date when the alleged first abuse of a dominant position started in Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In those countries, the alleged first abuse did not start when AZ sent its instructions to the patent attorneys, but when the SPC applications were transmitted to the national patent offices. In those circumstances, and in the light of recital 185 of the contested decision, the Court finds that the first abuse of a dominant position – if it is established – started on 30 June 1993 at the latest.

 

IPPT20100701, GCEU, AstraZeneca