TRADEMARK RIGHTS

ARTICLE 5(1) OF THE DIRECTIVE

Sign identical or similar to the trade mark

- Prohibited under Article 5(1)(a) of the directive when it affects or is liable to affect the functions of that trade mark.

It should, however, be remembered that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, the exclusive right under Article 5(1) of the directive was conferred in order to enable the trade mark proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor, that is, to ensure that the trade mark can fulfil its functions and that, therefore, the exercise of that right must be reserved to cases in which a third party’s use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, in particular its essential function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods (Arsenal Football Club, paragraph 51; Case C 245/02 Anheuser Busch [2004] ECR I 10989, paragraph 59). Therefore, the affixing by a third party of a sign identical to a trade mark registered for toys to scale models of vehicles cannot be prohibited under Article 5(1)(a) of the directive unless it affects or is liable to affect the functions of that trade mark.

Determine effect

- It is for the referring court to determine whether the use affects the functions of the Opel logo as a trade mark registered for toys.

In the case in the main proceedings, which is characterised by the fact that the trade mark in question is registered both for motor vehicles and for toys, the referring court has explained that, in Germany, the average consumer of the products of the toy industry, normally informed and reasonably attentive and circumspect, is used to scale models being based on real examples and even accords great importance to absolute fidelity to the original, so that that consumer will understand that the Opel logo appearing on Autec’s products indicates that this is a reduced-scale reproduction of an Opel car. If, by those explanations, the referring court in-tended to emphasise that the relevant public does not perceive the sign identical to the Opel logo appearing on the scale models marketed by Autec as an indication that those products come from Adam Opel or an under-taking economically linked to it, it would have to conclude that the use at issue in the main proceedings does not affect the essential function of the Opel logo as a trade mark registered for toys. It is for the referring court to determine, by refer-ence to the average consumer of toys in Germany, whether the use at issue in the main proceedings affects the functions of the Opel logo as a trade mark registered for toys. Moreover, Adam Opel does not appear to have claimed that that use affects functions of that trade mark other than its essential one.

Use of registered trade mark

- Since Autec does not sell vehicles, there is no use of the Opel logo by Autec as a trade mark registered for motor vehicles, for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of the directive.

Apart from that specific case of use of a trade mark by a third-party provider of services having as subject-matter the products bearing that trade mark, Article 5(1)(a) of the directive must be interpreted as covering the use of a sign identical to the trade mark in respect of goods marketed or services supplied by the third party which are identical to those in respect of which the trade mark is registered. First of all, the interpretation whereby the goods or services referred to in Article 5(1)(a) of the directive are those marketed or supplied by the third party fol-lows from the wording of that provision itself, particularly the words ‘using … in relation to goods or services’. Secondly, the contrary interpretation could lead to the words ‘goods’ and ‘services’ used in Article 5(1)(a) of the directive designating goods or services of the trade mark propri-eter, whereas the words ‘goods’ and ‘service’ appearing in Article 6(1)(b) and (c) of the directive necessarily refer to those marketed or sup-plied by the third party, thereby leading, contrary to the scheme of the directive, to interpreting the same words in a different way according to whether they appear in Article 5 or in Article 6.

ARTICLE 5(2) OF THE DIRECTIVE

Unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the registered trade mark

- The use is also capable of being prohibited if such use without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of that trade mark registered for motor vehicles.

The use at issue in the main proceedings is also capable of being prohibited, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the directive, if such use without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of that trade mark registered for motor vehicles. Adam Opel has argued at the hearing before the Court that it has an interest in the quality of scale mod-els of vehicles bearing the Opel trade mark being good, and in those models being absolutely up to date, as ot-erwise the reputation of that trade mark, as a trade mark registered for motor vehicles, would be affected. This is, in any event, an assessment of a fac-
tual nature. It is for the referring court, where necessary, to determine whether the use at issue in the main proceedings constitutes use without due cause which takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the registered trade mark.

ARTICLE 6(1)(b) OF THE DIRECTIVE
Affixing by third party
- The affixing by a third party do not constitute use of an indication concerning a characteristic of those scale models, that, where a trade mark is registered, inter alia, in respect of motor vehicles, the affixing by a third party, without the authorisation of the proprietor of the trade mark, of a sign identical to that mark to scale models of that make of vehicle, in order faithfully to reproduce those vehicles, and the marketing of those scale models, do not constitute use of an indication concerning a characteristic of those scale models, within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) of the directive.

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European Court of Justice, 25 January 2007
(P. Jann, K. Schiemann and M. Iliesić)
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber)
25 January 2007(*)
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Trade Marks – Article 5(1)(a) and (2), and Article 6(1)(b) of the First Directive 89/104/EEC – Right of a trade mark proprietor to prevent use by a third party of a sign identical or similar to the trade mark – Trade mark registered for motor vehicles and for toys – Reproduction of the trade mark by a third party on scale models of that make of vehicle)
In Case C-48/05,
REFERENCE for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC, by the Landgericht Nürnberg-Fürth (Germany), made by decision of 28 January 2005, received at the Court on 8 February 2005, in the proceedings
Adam Opel AG v Autec AG, intervener:
Deutscher Verband der Spielwaren-Industrie eV, by T. Nägele, Rechtsanwalt,
– the French Government, by G. de Bergues and A. Bodard-Hermant, acting as Agents,
– the United Kingdom Government, by M. Bethell, acting as Agent, assisted by M. Tappin, Barrister, and S. Malynicz, Barrister,
– the Commission of the European Communities, by G. Braun, B. Rasmussen and W. Wils, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 7 March 2006, gives the following
Judgment
1 The reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 5(1)(a) and 6(1)(b) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1; ‘the directive’).

Legal context
2 Article 5 of the directive, headed ‘Rights conferred by a trade mark’, provides:
‘The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade:
(a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered;
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark.

2. Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade:
(a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered;
(b) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are similar to those for which the trade mark is registered;
(c) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark.

3. The following, inter alia, may be prohibited under paragraphs 1 and 2:
(a) affixing the sign to the goods or to the packaging thereof;
(b) offering the goods, or putting them on the market or stocking them for these purposes under that sign, or offering or supplying services thereunder;
(c) importing or exporting the goods under the sign;
(d) using the sign on business papers and in advertising.

5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not affect provisions in any Member State relating to the protection against the use of a sign other than for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services, where use of that sign without
due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.’

3 Article 6 of the directive, headed ‘Limitation of the effects of a trade mark’, provides in paragraph (1): ‘The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, in the course of trade, (a) his own name or address; (b) indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of goods or services; (c) the trade mark where it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service, in particular as accessories or spare parts, provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.’

The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred

4 Adam Opel AG (‘Adam Opel’), a motor manufacturer, is the proprietor of the national figurative mark reproduced below, registered in Germany on 10 April 1990 for, inter alia, motor vehicles and toys (‘the Opel logo’):

5 Autec AG (‘Autec’) manufactures, inter alia, remote-controlled scale model cars, which it markets under the trade mark ‘Cartronic’.

6 At the beginning of 2004, Adam Opel discovered that a 1:24 remote-controlled scale model of the Opel Astra V8 coupé, bearing the Opel logo on its radiator grille like the original vehicle, was being marketed in Germany. That toy is manufactured by Autec.

7 The Cartronic trade mark, accompanied by the symbol ®, is clearly visible on the front page of the user instructions accompanying each scale model and also on the front of the remote control transmitter. In addition, the indications ‘AUTEC® AG’ and ‘AUTEC® AG D 90441 Nürnberg’ appear on the back of the user instructions, the latter indication appearing also on a sticker attached to the underside of the remote control transmitter.

8 By an application brought before the Landgericht Nürnberg-Fürth, Adam Opel sought an order, inter alia, that Autec be prohibited from commercially affixing the Opel logo on scale models of vehicles, from offering them for sale, marketing them, or holding them for such purposes, and from importing or exporting scale models bearing that trade mark, on pain of a fine of EUR 250 000 for each infringement or, in the alternative, a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months.

9 Adam Opel considers that use of the Opel logo on toys consisting of scale models vehicles which it manufactures and distributes constitutes an infringe-
Is this in particular the case if the manufacturer of the model car applies to the packaging, and to an accessory required in order to use the model, a mark recognisable to the trade as its own trade mark together with its company name and the address of its seat?" 

The questions referred

The first question

The interpretation of Article 5(1)(a) of the directive

By its first question, the referring court effectively asks whether, when a trade mark is registered both for motor vehicles and for toys, the affixing by a third party, without authorisation from the trade mark proprietor, of a sign identical to that trade mark on scale models of that make of car, in order to reproduce it faithfully, and the marketing of those scale models constitutes, for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of the directive, a use which the trade mark proprietor is entitled to prevent.

Article 5 of the directive defines the ‘[r]ights conferred by a trade mark’, whilst Article 6 contains rules concerning ‘[l]imitation of the effects of a trade mark’.

Under the first sentence of Article 5(1) of the directive, the registered trade mark confers exclusive rights on its proprietor. Under Article 5(1)(a), that exclusive right entitles the proprietor to prevent all third parties, acting without his consent, from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical to the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical to those for which the trade mark is registered. Article 5(3) gives a non-exhaustive list of the kinds of use which the proprietor may prohibit under Article 5(1). Other provisions of the directive, such as Article 6, define certain limitations on the effects of a trade mark (Case C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club [2002] ECR I-10273, paragraph 38).

In order to prevent the protection afforded to the proprietor varying from one State to another, the Court must therefore give a uniform interpretation to Article 5(1) of the directive, in particular the term ‘use’ which appears there (Arsenal Football Club, paragraph 45).

In the main proceedings, it is undisputed that the use of the sign identical to the mark is indeed use in the course of trade, since it takes place in the context of commercial activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter (see, to that effect, Arsenal Football Club, paragraph 40).

It is also undisputed that that use was made without the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark in question.

In so far as the Opel logo has been registered for toys, this is moreover the case envisaged in Article 5(1)(a) of the directive, namely that of a sign identical to the trade mark in question in relation to goods – toys – which are identical to those for which the trade mark was registered. In that regard, it should be noted in particular that the use at issue in the main proceedings is made ‘in relation to goods’ within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of the directive since it concerns the affixing of a sign identical to the trade mark onto goods and the offering of the goods, putting them on the market or

stocking them for those purposes within the meaning of Article 5(3)(a) and (b) of the directive (see, to that effect, Arsenal Football Club, paragraphs 40 and 41).

It should, however, be remembered that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, the exclusive right under Article 5(1) of the directive was conferred in order to enable the trade mark proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor, that is, to ensure that the trade mark can fulfil its functions and that, therefore, the exercise of that right must be reserved to cases in which a third party’s use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, in particular its essential function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods (Arsenal Football Club, paragraph 51; Case C-245/02 Anheuser-Busch [2004] ECR I-10989, paragraph 59).

Therefore, the affixing by a third party of a sign identical to a trade mark registered for toys to scale models of vehicles cannot be prohibited under Article 5(1)(a) of the directive unless it affects or is liable to affect the functions of that trade mark.

In the case in the main proceedings, which is characterised by the fact that the trade mark in question is registered both for motor vehicles and for toys, the referring court has explained that, in Germany, the average consumer of the products of the toy industry, normally informed and reasonably attentive and circumspect, is used to scale models being based on real examples and even accords great importance to absolute fidelity to the original, so that that consumer will understand that the Opel logo appearing on Autec’s products indicates that this is a reduced-scale reproduction of an Opel car.

If, by those explanations, the referring court intended to emphasise that the relevant public does not perceive the sign identical to the Opel logo appearing on the scale models marketed by Autec as an indication that those products come from Adam Opel or an undertaking economically linked to it, it would have to conclude that the use at issue in the main proceedings does not affect the essential function of the Opel logo as a trade mark registered for toys.

It is for the referring court to determine, by reference to the average consumer of toys in Germany, whether the use at issue in the main proceedings affects the functions of the Opel logo as a trade mark registered for toys. Moreover, Adam Opel does not appear to have claimed that that use affects functions of that trade mark other than its essential one.

In addition, on the basis of the BMW judgment, the referring court asks whether there may be use by Autec of the Opel logo in its capacity as a trade mark registered for motor vehicles.

In that respect, it is true that BMW concerned the use of a sign identical to the trade mark for services which were not identical to those for which that trade mark was registered, since the BMW trade mark, at issue in the main proceedings, was registered for vehicles but not for vehicle repair services. However, the vehicles marketed under the BMW trade mark by the proprietor of that mark constituted the subject-matter of
the services – the repairing of vehicles – supplied by the third party, so that it was essential to identify the origin of the BMW cars, the subject-matter of those services. It was having regard to that specific and indissociable link between the products bearing the trade mark and the services provided by the third party that the Court of Justice held that, in the specific circumstances of the BMW case, use by the third party of the sign identical to the trade mark in respect of goods marketed not by the third party but by the holder of the trade mark fell within Article 5(1)(a) of the directive.

28 Apart from that specific case of use of a trade mark by a third-party provider of services having as subject-matter the products bearing that trade mark, Article 5(1)(a) of the directive must be interpreted as covering the use of a sign identical to the trade mark in respect of goods marketed or services supplied by the third party which are identical to those in respect of which the trade mark is registered.

29 First of all, the interpretation whereby the goods or services referred to in Article 5(1)(a) of the directive are those marketed or supplied by the third party follows from the wording of that provision itself, particularly the words ‘using … in relation to goods or services’. Secondly, the contrary interpretation could lead to the words ‘goods’ and ‘services’ used in Article 5(1)(a) of the directive designating goods or services of the trade mark proprietor, whereas the words ‘goods’ and ‘service’ appearing in Article 6(1)(b) and (c) of the directive necessarily refer to those marketed or supplied by the third party, thereby leading, contrary to the scheme of the directive, to interpreting the same words in a different way according to whether they appear in Article 5 or in Article 6.

30 In the main proceedings, since Autec does not sell vehicles, there is no use of the Opel logo by Autec as a trade mark registered for motor vehicles, for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of the directive.

The interpretation of Article 5(2) of the directive

31 According to consistent case-law, it is for the Court to provide the national court with all those elements for the interpretation of Community law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has specifically referred to them in its questions (Case C 456/02 Trojan [2004] ECR I 7573, paragraph 38; Case C 258/04 Ioannidis [2005] ECR I 8275, paragraph 20).

32 Having regard to the circumstances in this case, the referring court must also be given an interpretation of Article 5(2) of the directive.

33 Unlike Article 5(1) of the directive, Article 5(2) does not require Member States to provide in their national law for the protection to which it refers, but merely permits them to provide such protection (Case C 292/00 Davidoff [2003] ECR I 389, paragraph 18). However, subject to verification by the referring court, the questions submitted by the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) and examined by the Court in Davidoff seem to imply that the German legislature has implemented the provisions of Article 5(2) of the directive.

34 In this case, first, the Opel logo is also registered for motor vehicles; secondly, subject to verification by the referring court, it is a trade mark well known in Germany for that kind of products, and, finally, a motor vehicle and a scale model of that vehicle are not similar products. Therefore, the use at issue in the main proceedings is also capable of being prohibited, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the directive, if such use without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of that trade mark registered for motor vehicles.

35 Adam Opel has argued at the hearing before the Court that it has an interest in the quality of scale models of vehicles bearing the Opel trade mark being good, and in those models being absolutely up to date, as otherwise the reputation of that trade mark, as a trade mark registered for motor vehicles, would be affected.

36 This is, in any event, an assessment of a factual nature. It is for the referring court, where necessary, to determine whether the use at issue in the main proceedings constitutes use without due cause which takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the registered trade mark.

37 Therefore, the answer to the first question must be that, where a trade mark is registered both for motor vehicles – in respect of which it is well known – and for toys, the affixing by a third party, without authorisation from the trade mark proprietor, of a sign identical to that trade mark on scale models of vehicles bearing that trade mark, in order faithfully to reproduce those vehicles, and the marketing of those scale models:

– constitute, for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of the directive, a use which the proprietor of the trade mark is entitled to prevent if that use affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark as a trade mark registered for toys;

– constitute, within the meaning of Article 5(2) of the directive, a use which the proprietor of the trade mark is entitled to prevent – where the protection defined in that provision has been introduced into national law – if, without due cause, use of that sign takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark as a trade mark registered for motor vehicles.

The second question

38 Although, in its second question, the referring court formally requests interpretation of Article 6(1)(a) of the directive, it is clear from the order for reference that it is in reality seeking an interpretation of Article 6(1)(b).

39 As a preliminary observation, it should be noted that the use of the Opel logo at issue in the main proceedings cannot be authorised on the basis of Article 6(1)(c) of the directive. The affixing of that trade mark on Autec’s scale models is not designed to indicate the intended purpose of those toys.

40 Under Article 6(1)(b) of the directive, the trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, in the course of trade, indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended pur-
pose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of goods or services.

41 Adam Opel and the French Government argue that the purpose pursued by that provision is, in particular, to prevent the proprietor of a trade mark from being able to oppose use by a third party of a descriptive indication of a characteristic of the latter’s goods or services. In this case, the Opel logo does not in any way indicate the kind, quality or other characteristics of the scale models. The Commission of the European Communities shares that opinion as regards the use at issue in the main proceedings, but does not exclude the possibility that, in other factual circumstances, in which the scale models were intended for collectors, identical reproduction of each detail of the original vehicle might constitute an essential characteristic of that category of products, so that Article 6(1)(b) of the directive might also cover the faithful copying of the trade mark.

42 In that regard, whilst this provision is primarily designed to prevent the proprietor of a trade mark from prohibiting competitors from using one or more descriptive terms forming part of his trade mark in order to indicate certain characteristics of their products (see, for example, Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 Windsurfing Chiemsee [1999] ECR I-2779, paragraph 28), its wording is in no way specific to such a situation.

43 One cannot therefore exclude a priori the possibility that that provision might authorise a third party to use a trade mark if such use consists in giving an indication concerning the kind, quality or other characteristics of products marketed by that third party, provided that use is made in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.

44 However, the affixing of a sign which is identical to a trade mark registered, inter alia, in respect of motor vehicles to scale models of that make of vehicle in order to reproduce those vehicles faithfully is not intended to provide an indication as to a characteristic of those scale models, but is merely an element in the faithful reproduction of the original vehicles.

45 The answer to the second question must therefore be that, where a trade mark is registered, inter alia, in respect of motor vehicles, the affixing by a third party, without the authorisation of the proprietor of the trade mark, of a sign identical to that mark to scale models of that make of vehicle, in order faithfully to reproduce those vehicles, and the marketing of those scale models, do not constitute use of an indication concerning a characteristic of those scale models, within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) of the directive.

The third question

46 In view of the answers given to the first two questions, it is unnecessary to reply to the third question.

Costs

47 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:

1. Where a trade mark is registered both for motor vehicles – in respect of which it is well known – and for toys, the affixing by a third party, without authorisation from the trade mark proprietor, of a sign identical to that trade mark on scale models of vehicles bearing that trade mark, in order faithfully to reproduce those vehicles, and the marketing of those scale models:

   — constitute, for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, a use which the proprietor of the trade mark is entitled to prevent if that use affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark as a trade mark registered for toys;

   — constitute, within the meaning of Article 5(2) of that directive, a use which the proprietor of the trade mark is entitled to prevent – where the protection defined in that provision has been introduced into national law – if, without due cause, use of that sign takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark as a trade mark registered for motor vehicles.

2. Where a trade mark is registered, inter alia, in respect of motor vehicles, the affixing by a third party, without the authorisation of the proprietor of the trade mark, of a sign identical to that mark to scale models of that make of vehicle, in order faithfully to reproduce those vehicles, and the marketing of those scale models, do not constitute use of an indication concerning a characteristic of those scale models, within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 89/104.

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL RUIZ-JARABO COLOMER

delivered on 7 March 2006 1(1)
Case C-48/05
Adam Opel AG v Autec AG
(Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Nürnberg-Fürth, Germany)
(Trade mark – Unlawful use – Scale models of cars)

I – Introduction

1. The Landgericht Nürnberg-Fürth (regional court with jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters) wishes to know whether miniature models which reproduce the cars of a well-known German manufacturer infringe the trade mark right protected by Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104/EEC (2) by applying the corresponding logo to the radiator grille. In the alternative, it inquires about the derogation in Article 6(1)(b) of that Community provision.

2. The doubt arises because the sign at issue, which was originally registered for real motor vehicles, was
subsequently extended to apply to toys. The referring court is therefore examining the scope of the protection afforded to the emblem of the car-manufacturing company in respect of its use on toy cars by third parties.

3. In his Opinion in OHIM v Zapf Creation, (3) Advocate General Jacobs rightly observed that ‘it is an essential characteristic of many toys [...] that they represent something’. I would add that the essence of a toy is that it recreates objects and events in world history in a form acceptable to the mind of a child or of anyone needing a more imaginative contact with his surroundings, transcending the hardship and suffering which are sometimes part of human existence. Before the Second World War, an Anglo-American expedition discovered, in the Caldean city of Ur, the tomb of a child who died four thousand years B.C.; also in the tomb was a little silver boat. So, more than six thousand years ago, there were traces of those artefacts which have accompanied the dreams of people setting out on the adventure of life. In this question referred for a preliminary ruling, it is therefore necessary to consider whether a replica of a trade mark also registered for toys, which imitate reality, infringes the rights of the proprietor of the trade mark or whether it may be regarded as one of the restrictions of those rights.

II – Legislative framework

4. In order to decide the case, the referring court requests the interpretation of Article 5(1)(a) and Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 89/104, equivalent to Article 14(2)(1) and Article 23(2) of the Markengesetz (4) (German Trade Mark Act) which therefore need not be reproduced here.

5. Article 5(1)(a) of the Directive, under the heading ‘Rights conferred by a trade mark’, provides: ‘1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade: (a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered;...

6. Under the heading ‘Limitation of the effects of a trade mark’, Article 6(1)(b) of the Directive states: 1. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, in the course of trade, (a) ...

(b) indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of goods or services; ...

provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. …”

III – The facts in the main action and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

7. The plaintiff in the main proceedings, Adam Opel AG (‘Opel’), is one of the largest companies in the European automobile industry, and one of the most well-known. (5) It has used the so-called ‘Opel Blitz’ as its logo for many years and is proprietor of the figurative Trade Mark No 1157264, reproduced below:

8. This emblem was entered in the German register on 10 April 1990 for various products and also for ‘toys’. The plaintiff therefore uses the trade mark for model cars, although it manufactures them through licensees and also sells them as part of its accessories line.

9. AUTEC AG, the defendant before the Landgericht Nürnberg-Fürth, produces remote-controlled scale model cars and markets them under the trade mark ‘Cartronic’.

10. In early 2004, Opel AG discovered that prototypes of remote-controlled cars in a scale of 1:24 were being sold on the German retail market for EUR 9 each. They included a replica of the Opel Astra V8 Coupe on which the protected trade mark had been applied to the radiator grille in the same way as on the original model of that vehicle.

11. It is apparent from the order for reference that the front of the user instructions provided with the packaging is clearly marked ‘Cartronic®’ and the rear refers to ‘AUTEC® AG’ and ‘AUTEC AG Daimler Strasse 61 D-90441 Nürnberg’. Similarly, the transmitter for the car is clearly marked ‘Cartronic®’ on its front side and its underside bears a sticker with the designation ‘AUTEC® AG D 90441 Nürnberg’.

12. Opel AG considers that the presence of its logo on the products of the other party to the proceedings infringes its industrial property rights. It claims that the defendant is using it in the same way for identical goods, namely toy cars, and therefore requests the following form of order: that the defendant be ordered to pay a fine of up to EUR 250 000.00, or alternatively to serve a term of imprisonment, and to remove the sign in question from commercial products, to pay compensation for all the damage suffered, and that it be prohibited from selling scale replicas of vehicles with that sign. It also requests that all the miniature cars marked with its logo be destroyed. (6)

13. The defendant in the main proceedings and the party intervening on its behalf, the German toy industry association (Deutscher Verband der Spielwaren-Industrie e.V.), contend that Opel AG’s claims should be dismissed.

14. Since the national court considers that a decision in this case depends on the interpretation of the aforementioned provisions, it has decided to stay proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does the use of a trade mark registered also for “toys” constitute use as a trade mark for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104, if the manufacturer of a toy model car copies a real car in a reduced scale, including the corresponding trade mark, and markets it? (2) If the answer is in the affirmative, is the type of use of the trade mark described in Question 1 an indication of the kind or quality of the model car within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 89/104? (3) If the answer is in the affirmative,
In cases of this type what are the decisive criteria to be applied in assessing whether the use of the trade mark corresponds to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters?

Is this in particular the case if the manufacturer of the model car applies to the packaging, and to an accessory required in order to use the toy, a mark recognisable to the trade as its own trade mark together with its company name and the address of its seat?

IV – Procedure before the Court of Justice

15. The order for reference was lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 8 February 2005.

16. Written observations were submitted, within the period prescribed for the purpose by Article 20 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, by Opel AG, AU-TEC AG, Deutscher Verband der Spielwaren-Industrie e.V., the French and United Kingdom Governments and the Commission of the European Communities.

17. The parties to the main proceedings, the interveners, the representatives of the United Kingdom Government and of the Commission presented oral argument at the hearing on 2 February 2006.

V – Analysis of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

A – Question 1

18. By its first question, the Landericht Nürnberg-Fürth wishes to know whether, in the circumstances of the main action, the Opel AG logo has been used ‘as a trade mark’, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice. It is therefore necessary to analyse in detail some opinions and judgments in the light of which the facts in the case must be considered.

19. Academic lawyers are unanimous in describing the rights of the owner of a registered sign as ‘exclusive rights’, (7) which allow him to prohibit third parties from using the trade mark without his consent.

20. The interpretation of Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104 starts in the judgment in BMW, (8) paragraph 38 of which defined the scope of the provision as depending on whether the emblem was used for the purpose of distinguishing the goods or services in question as originating from a particular undertaking, that is to say, as a trade mark, or whether it was used for other purposes.

21. Accordingly, an examination of the case law of the Court of Justice on the matter must focus on those two aspects: the use of the sign as a trade mark and its use for other purposes.

22. In the observations submitted to the Court of Justice the facts are not disputed and may therefore be regarded as established for the purposes of the exercise of the ius prohibendi by the holder of the industrial property right to which Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104 refers. Furthermore, it is for the national court to ascertain the facts. Something similar occurs with ‘goods’, within the meaning of that provision, since in the main proceedings there is a clear reference to manufactured articles. (9)

1. The use of a sign as a registered trade mark

23. Since the aforementioned judgment in BMW, the contours of the exclusive right conferred by Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104 have become more distinct in the light of subsequent judgments.

24. The Arsenal Football Club case is of paramount importance in this context. In my Opinion in that case, I pointed out that, when the Directive says that protection is absolute in the case of identity, it must be understood as meaning that, in light of the aim and the purpose of trade mark law, ‘absolute’ means that protection is afforded to the proprietor, irrespective of whether there is a likelihood of confusion, because in such situations there is a presumption that there is such a likelihood, and not, on the contrary, that protection is accorded to the proprietor erga omnes and in all circumstances. Article 5(1)(a) therefore creates a presumption iuris tantum, where there is identity between the products. (10)

25. Similarly, the judgments of the Court of Justice, taking a teleological approach to the provisions at issue, have held that the exclusive right under Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104 was conferred in order to enable the trade mark proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor, that is, to ensure that the trade mark can fulfil its functions, in particular the function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods. (11)

26. According to settled case-law, the essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the product or service to the final purchaser by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which have another origin, confirming that they have been manufactured or provided by a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality. (12)

27. In the main proceedings it is clear that the toy models bear the Opel emblem on the bodywork, regardless of whether they have been manufactured by one of the undertaking’s licensees or by a third party, and that the likeness is such that it hints at the identity of goods to which the provision at issue refers. However, it is for the national court to make that assessment, as I pointed out in the Opinion in the Arsenal Football Club case. (13)

28. Finally, the judgment in that case indicated the limits of the exercise of the powers conferred by Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104 on the proprietor of a sign, denying him the right to prohibit the use of an identical sign if that use cannot affect his own interests as proprietor of the mark in the terms set out. Thus certain uses for purely descriptive purposes are excluded from the scope of the provision. (14)

29. The judgment in Anheuser-Busch (15) indicated the means of establishing possible damage, indicating that this is the case when the use of that sign allegedly made by the third party is such as to create the impression that there is a material link in trade between the third party’s goods and the proprietor of the trade mark. It must be established whether the consumers targeted interpret the sign, as it is used by the third party, as designating the undertaking which is the proprietor of the trade mark. (16) Immediately afterwards, it reiterates that the national court must establish whether that is the
case in the light of the specific circumstances of the main case. (17)

2. Uses unrelated to the functions proper to trade marks

30. The use of a sign in accordance with the rules set out in the judgment in BMW, cited above, is the only one, in the system of the Directive, which escapes the powers conferred on the proprietor of a trade mark by Article 5 (1) (a) of Directive 89/104.

31. The exceptions provided by Article 6, in particular those in Article 6(1)(b), apply when the registered emblem fulfils the function typical of the trade mark, but, for reasons of public interest, third parties are authorised, in certain circumstances, to enjoy their advantages.

32. According to the case-law, references made to trade marks for purely descriptive purposes do not constitute use as a trade mark since, in such situations, there is no infringement of any of the interests which Article 5(1) is intended to protect. (18)

33. In my Opinion in the Arsenal Football Club case, I opted for an approach which included non-commercial uses, amongst which I listed private uses, the use of symbols which do not meet the conditions for registration, and uses for educational purposes. (19)

34. To sum up, the uses unrelated to the functions proper to trade marks constitute an open category, which must be filled casuistically and gradually, so that, unlike the situation under Article 6(1) of Directive 89/104, they do not require a restrictive interpretation because they are not exceptions to but limits on the enjoyment of the ius prohibendi.

3. Connection with the facts in the main proceedings

35. Once the relevant case-law has been outlined, the task of providing the referring court with a helpful reply must focus on the search for uniform guidelines appropriate to the factual circumstances surrounding the questions referred for a preliminary ruling.

36. In the present case, the application of the ‘Opel blitz’ logo on the toys is the kind of use which is unrelated to the function of the trade mark for two sets of reasons:

a) The nature of the product at issue

37. Since 1898, it has been usual in the toy industry to manufacture and market small-scale models of real cars, which also happens with other means of locomotion (trains, planes and ships). The little cars have become the ‘Proust’s madeleine’ of adults reliving their childhood experiences in short trousers, (21) by indulging their fantasies.

38. Although in the beginning it was sought to reproduce reality in miniature for the benefit of a very specific public, children, to bring the adult world closer to them, in a form adapted to their size, (22) as time went by, the circle of persons for whom they were intended widened to include the adult collector. This latter sector was probably more demanding as regards the quality of the copy, requiring it to be closer to the original. Nowadays, therefore, this type of article is not designed without copying not only the most significant characteristics but also the most trivial.

39. The Commission rightly asserts that the manufacturer of these replicas satisfies the customer’s wishes regarding a faithful imitation of the original only if he is allowed to copy it in every detail, including the indications which appear on the real car, as, for example, in its catalogues.

40. However, the motor industry only recently became aware of the economic potential of those objects through merchandising, using them as an advertising ploy to win customer loyalty, as Opel AG acknowledges and as may be inferred, in the case of this undertaking, from the fact that its logo was not extended to toys until 1990, as is stated in its own observations. It is therefore hard to imagine that the public automatically associates the cars’ emblem with the manufacturer.

41. Similarly, as the Commission points out, there is the risk of a monopoly in the miniatures market, the consequence of an excessively strict interpretation of the scope of the ius prohibendi, insofar as licensees would have an exclusive right to imitate the real cars in minute detail, and the freedom of establishment of their competitors would be unjustifiably restricted.

b) The perception of the consumer

42. It has already been shown that, according to the judgment in Anheuser-Busch, a finding that harm may have been caused by the use allegedly made by the third party depends on whether that use is such as to create the impression that there is a material link in trade between the third party’s goods and the undertaking which is the proprietor of the trade mark. It must be established whether the consumers targeted interpret the sign as designating the undertaking which has registered it.

43. The referring court has examined the connection between the Opel emblem placed on the models and the original trade mark, taking the view that the public recognises the toy as a model of a real Opel car. That is to say, it connects the scale prototype with the real vehicle, not with the models manufactured for Opel AG by its licensees.

44. I agree with the Commission that it cannot be inferred from the above that, in the main proceedings, the trade mark is infringed, which would happen only if the consumer were to associate the Opel logo on the miniatures manufactured by third parties with the logo applied to the models marketed by Opel AG. In any event, the fact that the user connects the trade mark of the toy with the trade mark of the original is the inevitable result of the accurate reproduction which it is sought to achieve in order to win over the public, by fulfilling its wishes. (23)

45. Moreover, I consider that the model and its original do not belong to the same category of goods;
therefore, they are not identical products for the purposes of Article 5 (1) (a) of Directive 89/104.

46. In the light of the reasons stated above, I propose that the Court of Justice give the following reply to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling:

The use for toys of a registered sign does not constitute use as a trade mark within the meaning of Article 5 (1) (a) of Directive 89/104, where the manufacturer of a toy model car copies a real car in a reduced scale, including the proprietor’s trade mark, and markets it.

B – Questions 2 and 3

47. Questions 2 and 3 have been raised only in the event of an affirmative reply to Question 1, so that, in the light of what I have suggested, it would not be necessary to consider them. However, I shall make a few observations on them, in the alternative and merely hypothetically.

48. I therefore start from the assumption that, in the main proceedings, Opel AG’s trade mark right has been infringed and that consideration is being given as to whether that infringement might fall within the derogation under Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 89/04.

49. The Landgericht Nürnberg-Fürth seems to agree that the use of the trade mark in question should be regarded as an indication concerning only kind or quality, not of ‘other characteristics’, as referred to in the aforementioned article.

50. This provision seeks a balance between the monopolistic interests of the holder of the industrial property rights and the interests of trade, by protecting the freedom to use concepts to describe goods and services. (24) However, as the Commission rightly points out, its nature as an exception to Article 5 requires that it be interpreted restrictively, so it is difficult to allow the reproduction of the Opel sign on the bodywork of the miniature cars to be described as an indication concerning kind or quality.

51. However, since the activity of creating models consists basically in making an accurate and detailed copy of reality, it may be considered that the emblem of the trade mark is an inherent part of the original which, in order for the consumer to be better informed and for all operators in the sector to compete on the same terms, (25) is one of those other characteristics to which Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 89/104 refers.

52. This solution means that each scale model of a vehicle is a kind of product, within which there are several offers.

53. Once it is accepted that the facts in the main action fall within the scope of Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 89/104, it is necessary to find the unknown quantity in Question 3, which is whether the Opel trade mark has been used in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters, the second prerequisite for application of that provision.

54. In this regard, the recent case-law of the Court of Justice gives clear guidelines, and I need therefore refer to them only briefly.

55. The Court has reiterated, first, that the condition that the trade mark be used in accordance with prevailing market practices constitutes the expression of a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark owner. (26)

56. Secondly, the judgment in The Gillette Company and Gillette Group Finland (27) provided the interpretation of those words, stating that use of the mark does not comply with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters in particular where it gives the impression that there is a commercial connection between the third party and the trade mark proprietor, where it affects the value of the trade mark by taking unfair advantage of its distinctive character or repute; where it discredits or denigrates that mark; or where the third party presents its product as an imitation or replica of the product bearing the trade mark of which it is not the owner.

57. This last situation does not include miniature toys, since they do not copy the models made by Opel’s licensees but the actual vehicle manufactured by that automobile company, the Opel Astra V8 Coupe.

58. In the judgment in Anheuser-Busch, the Court of Justice pointed out that, in assessing whether the condition of honest practice is satisfied, account must be taken first of the extent to which the use of the third party’s trade name is understood by the relevant public, or at least a significant section of that public, as indicating a link between the third party’s goods and the trademark proprietor or a person authorised to use the trade mark, and secondly of the extent to which the third party ought to have been aware of that. Another factor to be taken into account is whether the trade mark concerned enjoys a certain reputation in the Member State in which it is registered and its protection is sought, from which the third party might profit in selling his goods. (28)

59. Those criteria are available to the national court to apply to the case pending before it. Indeed, the last judgment cited added that it is for the national court to carry out an overall assessment of all the relevant circumstances in order to determine whether the use has been made in accordance with the honest practices referred to. (29)

60. I therefore venture to suggest that the manner in which AUTEC presents its products, clearly displaying its sign ‘Cartronic®’ and the indications ‘AUTEC® AG’ and ‘Autec AG Daimler Strasse 61 D 90441 Nürnberg’, even on the transmitter, shows that it has behaved properly, in complete accordance with commercial practice. It is therefore impossible to discern in this conduct any unlawful use of the Opel trade mark, which is placed where any consumer would expect to find it: on the radiator grille of the vehicle.

61. In the light of the arguments put forward, I suggest that the Court of Justice examine, if appropriate, the second and third questions in accordance with what has been stated above.

VI – Conclusion

62. In the light of the above considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice give the following reply to the Landgericht Nürnberg-Fürth: 1. The use of a registered sign on toys does not constitute use as a trade mark, within the meaning of Article
5(1)(a) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, where the manufacturer of a toy model car copies a real car in a reduced scale, including the trade mark, and markets it.

63. If the Court of Justice does not share this view in respect of Question 1, I suggest that it give the following replies to Questions 2 and 3:

2. The use of the trade mark described in Question 1 is an indication concerning other characteristics of the model car within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 89/104.

3. In situations such as the one in this case, the decisive criteria for determining whether the trade mark is used in accordance with honest practice in industrial or commercial matters are those laid down by the Court of Justice in the judgments in Anheuser-Busch and The Gillette Company and Gillette Group.

If the manufacturer of a model car applies to the packaging, and to an accessory required in order to use the toy, a mark recognisable to the trade as its own trade mark together with its company name and the address of its seat, it is acting in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters, subject to an overall consideration of all the relevant circumstances, which is a matter for the national court.

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1 – Original language: Spanish.
5 – Details of the volume of sales given in the observations of Opel AG’s representative reveal the company’s financial strength: in 2004 it sold 351 955 vehicles on the German market and more than a million on the European market; for the same year, its market share in Germany was 10.24% and the level of brand recognition was about 96%.
6 – It is easier to gauge the scope of these claims in the light of the figures adduced as proof by Opel AG at the hearing; it stated that it works with 23 licensees, who cover 85% of production, with sales of 600 000 products in 2004, and about 760 000 in 2005.
8 – Case C-63/97 Bayerische Motorenwerke AG (BMW) and BMW Nederland BV v Ronald Karel Deknik [1999] ECR I-905.
9 – Following the methodological approach of the judgment in Case C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club [2002] ECR I-10273, paragraphs 40 and 41 (‘the Arsenal Football Club judgment’).
10 – Points 51 and 52 of the Opinion.
11 – Paragraph 51 of the judgment in the Arsenal Football Club case.
13 – Points 53 and 54.
14 – Paragraph 54 of the judgment in the Arsenal Football Club case.
16 – Paragraph 60 of the judgment cited in the previous footnote, which raises the assessments made by the Court of Justice in paragraphs 56 and 57 of the Arsenal Football Club case to the level of a general statement.
17 – Paragraph 61.
18 – Judgment in Case C-2/00 Hölterhoff [2002] ECR I-4187, paragraph 16. The case related to a commercial transaction in which Mr Hölterhoff offered to sell a customer some semiprecious and ornamental stones, with cuts which he called ‘Spirit Sun’ and ‘Context Cut’, trade marks registered in the name of Mr Frei-esleben. The customer ordered two garnets with the Spirit Sun cut from Mr Hölterhoff and, although on the delivery note and the invoice there was no reference to those trade marks, their proprietor brought proceedings against Mr Hölterhoff.
19 – Points 55 to 64 of the Opinion in the Arsenal Football Club case.
20 – Point 53 of the Opinion in the Arsenal Football Club case.
22 – The psychology of children does not always take the same path; there are many examples of children who follow their imagination rather than emulate their elders; Ana María Matute, in her tale ‘La rama seca’ (The withered branch), Historias de la Artámila, Ediciones Destino, Barcelona, 1993, pp. 123 et seq., gives a touching account of how a little girl plays with her ‘doll’ whom she calls ‘Pipa’, which is only a ‘little withered branch’ wrapped in a piece of calico tied with a cord (p. 125). The child falls ill and has to stay in bed without her doll, which has been irretrievably lost. When her neighbour Doña Clementina brings her ‘a
doll with curly hair and round eyes’ she cries in disappointment, ‘But it isn’t Pipa! It isn’t Pipa!’ (p. 129).

23 – In his tale ‘The Little Tin Soldier’, Hans-Christian Andersen describes the consumer’s expectations of replicas and his disappointment when they are not perfect, when he writes: ‘When [...] he finally had the box in his hands, he ran excitedly up to his room and, closing the door behind him, opened it almost reverently. His heart leaped! Lying in green tissue-paper were little soldiers in smart, shiny uniforms, their rifles on their shoulders. But, oh what a pity! Among those spruce and smiling soldiers there was one – just one – with only one leg’ (free translation).


25 – Fernández-Nóvoa, C., op. cit., p. 459, draws attention to the fact that the aim of the provision referred to is to protect these interests.

26 – Judgment in BMW, paragraph 61; and the judgment in Case C 100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen [2004] ECR I 691, paragraph 24.

27 – Case C 228/03 TheGillette Company and Gillette Group Finland v LALaboratories Ltd Oy [2005] ECR I 2337.

28 – Paragraph 83 of the judgment in Anheuser-Busch.

29 – Paragraph 84 of the judgment cited in the previous footnote.